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HOW PATENTS BECAME RIGHTS AND
WHY WE SHOULD CARE
Oren Bracha*
It has become fashionable to speak of the "commodification of
information."' Although this trend is by no means limited to
intellectual property scholars, it is, unsurprisingly, especially
prevalent among them. Recent developments in intellectual property
law, we are often told, have led to a dramatic increase in the
commodification of intellectual goods. Treatment of the subcategory
of patents commonly follows the same pattern. It is argued that the
subject matter of patent, be it scientific research or other innovative
information, is undergoing a process of commodification.
2
But what exactly does this mean? Commodification is a
complex term with a long etymology, which I will not explore here.
As befits such a complex term, it has multiple meanings that are not
always consistent with each other.3  Still, I think that when
contemporary intellectual property scholars employ the term, they
usually do it to roughly communicate the same idea: that being
commodified means being transferable, or being a potential object of
a commercial transaction in the market. When something (e.g., a
human kidney or a method of doing business) changes its legal or
social status from being non-transferable in commercial exchange to
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of Law.
Thanks to William Fisher for his helpful comments about some of the
arguments in this essay and Anne Airaudi for her excellent research assistance.
1. See THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION (Niva Elkin-Koren &
Neil Weinstock. Netanel eds., 2002).
2. Neil W. Netanel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Introduction: The
Commodification of Information, in id. at vii, viii.
3. See Eli Noam, Two Cheers for the Commodification of Information, in
THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION, supra note 1, at 43. 46-47.
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being an object of market transaction, we say it has been
commodified.
If this is the relevant meaning of the term, one may wonder what
all the commodification buzz is about.4 After all, not only various
kinds of information, but also entitlements in information have been
subject to commercial exchange under the sanction of the law for
centuries. Sixteenth century English stationers regularly sold, and
even mortgaged, the "copyrights" in "their books." 5 Royal patent
grants of the seventeenth century routinely confirmed that the
entitlements they created applied to assignees. 6 Is there anything
new, then, about the commodification of information?
One answer is that the scope and scale of commodification are
new. Due to the remarkable ongoing expansion of the subject matter
covered by various intellectual property rights,7 much larger
quantities of information are being subjected to commercial
exchange in the market. The growing duration of some intellectual
property rights means that it retains this status longer. I do not wish
to deny that the expansion of subject matter and the extension of the
duration of intellectual property rights are important dimensions of
recent developments, but I think that this answer is incomplete.
Taken in isolation, it is over-essentialist. It implicitly assumes a
static and one-dimensional model of commodification (as market
transferability) and simply argues that an increasing relative share of
informational goods is subjected to it. What is missing in this picture
is that the development of intellectual property rights involved not
4. Id. at 50.
5. See John Feather, From Rights in Copies to Copyright: The Recognition
of Authors' Rights in English Law and Practice in the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP TEXTUAL
APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 191, 197 (Martha Woodmansee &
Peter Jaszi eds., 1994); see also LYMAN RAY PATTrERSON, COPYRIGHT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 54-59, 71-73 (1968).
6. Little is known about the actual market practices of early English
patents. However, the common phrasing of patent grants conferred the
privileges granted on the patentee's assignees. Feather, supra note 5, at 197;
see also, BRUCE W. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND
COPYRIGHT LAW 31-33 (1967) (discussing English patent policy).
7. See William W. Fisher III, The Growth of Intellectual Property: A
History of the Ownership of Ideas in the United States, 1-10, at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf (last visited Sept. 20,
2004).
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just more commodification, but also the transformation and
construction of a particular model of commodification.
A good starting point for explaining my argument is a short
description from someone who is perhaps currently the most
influential scholar on the subject.8  "The touchstone of
commodification," writes Margaret Radin, "is the organized activity
of exchange, supported by the legal infrastructure of private-
property-plus-free-contract. One may read this as simply a
statement of the commodification as transferability in the market
model. Then again, institutional economics has taught us that there
is no such thing as the market, and legal realism has taught us that
there is no such thing as the legal infrastructure of private-property-
plus-free-contract. Put differently, the market is an amalgam of
particular social institutions that construct, channel, and shape the
commercial exchange interaction in a certain society.'
0 In various
societies, one can find different variants and mixes of those
institutions. The legal infrastructure, and particularly the property
and contract portion of it, is usually the most important parts of the
institutional details i" that constitute a particular market. Here, too,
though, one cannot find an essential model of institutional
arrangements. Property and contract law consist of endless choices
and combinations. Each particular mix constructs a particular
market. None of those markets is more the market than the actual
and possible others.
The same insight applies to commodification. Defining
commodification as the state of being an object of exchange in the
8. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996).
9. Margaret J. Radin, Incomplete Commodification in the Computerized
World, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION, supra note 1, at 3-4.
10. On institutional economics, see James M. Acheson, Welcome to Nobel
Country: A Review of Institutional Economics, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 3 (James M. Acheson ed., 1994). On the
interaction of institutional economics and legal history, see Ron Harris, The
Encounters of Economic History and Legal History, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 297
(2003).
11. Throughout this text I use the terms "institutions" and "institutional" in
the broad sense characteristic of institutional economics. In this usage the
terms are not limited to social, political, or administrative organizations (such
as courts or legislatures); rather, they encompass all social, legal and
administrative norms and practices. For a critical view of this comprehensive
indiscriminating usage, see Acheson, supra note 10, at 25.
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market supported by the legal infrastructure of property and contract
begs the question: what market? Hence, the interesting question
becomes not so much how much commodification, but what kind of
commodification. In other words, it becomes just as important to
explore the structure and the development of the particular
framework of the market within which something becomes a
commodity. In the field of information, intellectual property law
forms the lion share of the property and contract infrastructure that
creates the matrix of a specific market. Hence the conceptual and
institutional structure of intellectual property rights is the key for
understanding the commodification of information.
When one looks at the history of intellectual property from this
perspective, the illusion of inertness disappears. Seventeenth century
copyrights and patents allowed the transferability of information in
the market and were themselves transferable. 12  These complex
social-legal constructs were very different from the ones familiar to
us today, however. Hence, the market they constituted was very
different. There is an important story to tell here about the
development and transformation of intellectual property rights into
their modem form. It tells us that the commodification of
information is not merely the spread of one constant model of market
transferability of intangibles, but rather the gradual con'struction and
mutation of a particular institutional model.
The purpose of this essay is to explore in detail the development
within the Anglo-American legal tradition of one aspect of the
institutional model that defines and shapes entitlements in patent law,
and market exchange of the sort of resources and goods governed by
patent law. I do not provide here a complete account of the
development of English and American patent law or systems. Nor
do I explore the history of all the central aspects of the Anglo-
American institutional model of patents. Rather, I intend this essay
to be a focused, two and one half centuries deep, longitudinal cut into
only one of the key components of this model. Its focus is on the
character of the entitlements created by patent law and the
development of the modem conception of patents as rights.
The general trajectory of the development of patents in this
respect went from privileges to rights. The social meaning and legal
12. See Feather, supra note 5, at 197.
Fall 2004] THE COMMODIFICATION OF PATENTS
infrastructure of patents transformed gradually, but dramatically,
along this axis during the period covered. Patents changed from
case-specific discretionary policy or political grants of special
privileges designed to achieve individually defined public purposes,
to general standardized legal rights conferring a uniform set of
entitlements whenever predefined criteria are fulfilled.
This Article tracks this aspect of the institutional development of
patents from their early origins in late sixteenth century England,
through the mid-nineteenth century in the United States. Part I
briefly explains what I perceive to be the modem institutional model
of patent rights. In Part II, I explore the development of patents in
England, as well as that of the early American patent grant practices
in the American colonies and the States. I argue that while patents
had undergone significant changes throughout a period of two-
hundred years, by the time of the inception of the American federal
regime, the institutional model of patents was still quite different
from the modem one. Part III describes the emergence of this
modem model of patent rights in the United States during the first
half of the nineteenth century. The historical process of institutional
and conceptual change, which I describe, had produced the peculiar
model of owning and commercializing information in the market that
we usually take for granted today. The essay concludes with a
preliminary discussion of some of the possible current implications
of the historical development of patents and of the modem
framework of patent rights that this process produced.
I. PATENT RIGHTS
Modem patents are legal rights. This commonsensical assertion
represents a rather complex set of institutional arrangements. Let me
start by briefly stating the main components of this institutional
model. First of all, patents are part of a general legal regime.13 That
is to say, patent entitlements, as well as related norms and
procedures, are created and defined by law-mostly statutory law-
of general applicability. For example, if P receives a patent in the
United States, it is not because some agency of the executive branch
decided that it constituted good policy to create P's patent. Nor is it
because Congress legislated a specific law that created P's patent,
13. See P.J. Federico, State Patents, 13 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 166, 166 (1931).
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although Congress has the power to legislate such a law. Rather, P
receives a patent because the general patent regime defined by law
mandates that whenever a set of substantive and procedural
conditions arise, a patent must be issued.
As apparent from the description above, the general legal regime
defines standard patentability criteria. It defines, in general uniform
terms, the kinds of persons that may receive a patent, the possible
subject matter of patents, the substantive conditions that must occur
for a valid patent to be issued, and the procedures that must be
followed. 14 Whenever those patentability criteria are fulfilled, the
relevant person is entitled to a patent. 15 That is to say, she has a right
to receive a standard set of exclusive entitlements vis-A-vis the
patented invention. These entitlements are enforceable against
others in legal proceedings in the courts.'
6
A crucial element here is that whenever the general patentability
criteria are met, patentees have a right to their standard set of
entitlements. The state agency in charge of issuing patents-in the
United States the Patent and Trademark Office-has a correlative
duty to issue a patent whenever those standard criteria are met, and
the courts have a duty to enforce the patent entitlements if infringed.
If the state agency fails to issue a patent, because it thinks that the
criteria were not met or for any other reason, the would-be patentee
may "demand" a patent. The patentee can turn to a designated
supervising authority and ultimately to a court. The role of the court
is to interpret and apply, and sometime to judicially legislate, the
general patentability criteria. In a case in which the authoritative
application of the uniform patentability norms is in favor of the
would-be patentee, the court would order and enforce the issuance of
a patent and the issuing agency would have a duty to issue.
I will call the combination of elements described above "the
patent-rights model." Later in this essay I will discuss some of the
implications of this institutional model. At the moment, however, let
us turn to its history within the Anglo-American legal tradition. This
history begins in late sixteenth century England with a set of
administrative practices called "letters patent" that did not have any
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., BUGBEE, supra note 6, at 143-44.
16. Id.
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of the characteristics described above as the crucial elements of the
patent-rights model.' 
7
II. ENGLISH AND COLONIAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
PATENT LAW
A. English Patents
1. The Early Patent Grant
In order to understand early English patents for invention,
modem observers must forget everything they know about patents.
Early Anglo-American patents were entirely different creatures from
the ones familiar to the modem observer. The administrative
practices that eventually developed into what we call patents were
individual governmental monopoly grants that first appeared in a few
Italian republics in the fifteenth century.18 Although there were prior
antecedents in England, 19 the rise of the extensive and systematic use
of invention patent grants occurred there during the late sixteenth
century20 under the reign of Elizabeth 1.21
17. The word patent is derived from the Latin verb patere, which means to
be open. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE: UNABRIDGED 1654 (Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds
1986).
18. For early origins of patents in Europe, see BUGBEE, supra note 6, at
12-27; see also Ramon A. Klitzke, Historical Background of the English
Patent Law, 41. J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 615, 616-21 (1959); Giulio Mandich,
Venetian Origins of Inventors' Rights, 42 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 378 (1960);
Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 711 (1944); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of
the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (pt. 1), 76 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 697,
699-715 (1994).
19. The earliest English patent known is probably the 1331 grant by
Edward III to John Kempe for cloth making. For a survey of early grants, see
E. W. Hulme, The History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative and at
Common Law, 12 LAW Q. REV. 141, 141-44 (1896). Those early grants,
however, were "letters of protection." Klitzke, supra note 18, at 623. They
lacked any element of privilege of exclusivity or a monopoly bestowed on the
grantee. These letters of protection provided the "king's protection" to
foreigners and a license to practice their trade in spite of guild and other
similar limitations and restrictions. Id. at 623-24 (comparing the letters of
protection to passports).
20. Historians disagree over which was the first "genuine" patent for
invention in England. See MOUREEN COULTER, PROPERTY IN IDEAS: THE
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The very employment of the term "patents for inventions" in the
context of this early period is an anachronism. Patents for invention
simply did not exist as a clearly differentiated category in this time's
discourse or practice. Monopoly privilege grants to "inventors"--
another anachronism 22-were part of a much larger group of royal
grants of various kinds made by "letter patents," or litterae
patentes.2 3 The term literally referred to the official document used
in such grants: an open letter addressed to the public24 that
announced the privileges conferred by the king upon a specific
grantee2 As a derivable usage, it came to signify the entire
administrative channel for conducting official business and
exercising the royal prerogative. Blackstone's much later and often
cited reference to patents captured this understanding.2 6  In the
Commentaries, he spoke of "grants, whether of lands, honours,
liberties, franchises, or ought besides, [that] are contained in charters,
PATENT QUESTION IN MID-VICTORIAN BRITAIN (1990). The debate about
which was the first "genuine" patent for invention is somewhat anachronistic
and counterproductive. The arguments revolve around the question of which
patent was granted for a "genuine" invention in the modem sense. This focus
tends to obscure the most significant fact, which is that the modem concept of
invention did not exist and that patents for invention were not conceived as a
separate category.
21. Those grants were part of a policy for the encouragement of industry by
Elizabeth's first Secretary of State, William Cecil (Lord Burleigh). During the
reign of Elizabeth I there were fifty-five patents for inventions issued.
Twenty-one of them were issued to non-English subjects. E. W. Hulme, The
History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative and at Common Law: A
Sequel, 16 LAW Q. REv. 44, 52 (1900).
22. Another important respect in which early patents differed from modem
ones is the concept of invention underlying them. The focus of early invention
patents was neither on information nor on technological innovation. Rather, at
the focal meaning of invention was the exercise in practice of a new economic
"trade" or "art." Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United
States Patent Law: Antecedents (pt. 2.), 76 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 849, 857
(1994); see also D. Seabome Davies, The Early History of the Patent
Specification (pt. 1), 50 LAW Q. REv. 86, 95-96 (1934). The history of this
aspect of the development of patents is beyond the scope of this essay.
23. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND,
346 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1766); see also COULTER, supra note 20, at 7.
24. Letter patents stood in contrast to litterae clausae, sealed closed
documents that did not become public records. Walterscheid, supra note 18, at
700-01.
25. Id.
26. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at 346.
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or letters patent that is, open letters, [literae patentees]: so called
because they are not sealed up, but exposed to open view, with the
great seal pendant at the bottom; and are usually directed or
addressed by the king to all his subjects at large.' '27 Patents for
invention were yet another brand of those grants and were not
usually thought of as constituting a special category.
The early patent grant had none of the elements of the patent-
rights model. The grant practices created a fundamentally different
institutional model, which I shall here call "patent-privileges." To
begin with, patents for invention were not governed by a general
legal regime. In this early period no such thing as a "patent system"
existed in England. Moreover, there was no patent law, in the sense
of a coherent and comprehensive corpus of legal doctrines that
defined and governed the practice of patents for invention.28 The
conceptual-institutional scheme of early invention patents was latent
in, and must be reconstructed from, the actual grant practices, such as
the bureaucratic procedures involved or the typical content of patent
grants.
29
A patent was a creature of royal prerogative. It was based on
case-specific policy decisions of the monarch to confer particular
privileges on a certain individual in order to promote some
economic, social, or political goal.3°  Since patent grants were
discretionary "deals," there were no general patentability criteria for
receiving a patent or for insuring the issuance of one.31 Moreover,
even when a patent was granted, the privileges it created were not
standard.32 Each grant created its own tailored set of mutual
"considerations," namely, the public benefits a patentee was
27. Id.
28. Scattered common law cases started to appear at the beginning of the
seventeenth century. See infra note 75. However, even those early cases,
despite their later importance, did not come close to creating anything that
could be called "patent law."
29. CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, THE
ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1660-1800, at 2 (1988).
30. See George Ramsey, The Historical Background of Patents, 18 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 6, 6-9 (1936).
31. See MACLEOD, supra note 29, at 2-3.
32. Davies, supra note 22, at 97.
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expected to supply and the privileges that the patentee received in
return.
33
In this framework, a patent was by no means a right in the
modem sense of the term. The idea of anyone having a right to a
patent, upon the fulfillment of a few standard requirements and of a
corresponding duty to issue, stood in sharp contrast to the grant
system's raison d'etre.34 The grant was a tool for dispensing royal
policy and was based on royal discretion. The king granted all
patents as "a matter of grace and favour." 35 This meant that though
some general policy may have applied with regard to a certain class
of cases, each grant was an independent decision based on the
exercise of specific discretion and a weighing of the interests
involved. No matter how novel or ingenious a specific invention
was, no one could claim a right to be granted royal privileges in the
form of a patent. Similarly, no institution-court or otherwise-
could declare and enforce a "duty" of the crown to issue a patent.
36
Instead, it was always a matter of royal prerogative and discretion to
bestow such a privilege as a specific policy response to a specific
plea.
37
This patent-privileges framework was embedded in various
administrative practices. Patent petitions and the patent grants
themselves opened with recitals of the specific benefits that the
patentee offered to the realm and the crown.
In later times, these recitals gradually fossilized into a mere
formality, but in the early patent practice they were quite viable and
served a genuine function. The descriptions in the recitals were not
general assertions of utility, but rather accounts of the specific and
tangible benefits offered. These benefits might have included
decreasing unemployment, providing relief to a "decayed town," or
supplying a needed commodity superior in price or quality to
33. Id.
34. See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF
USEFUL ARTS: THE AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798-
1836, at 38 n.50.
35. This term became a common description of patents when the earliest
legal treatises started to appear at the beginning of the nineteenth century. See
infra text accompanying notes 182-183.
36. See Hulme, supra note 19, at 151.
37. See Walterscheid, supra note 22, at 863.
38. Davies, supra note 22, at 98.
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imported ones. They might have included strengthening the defense
of the realm, increasing the numbers of certain essential workers
such as mariners or miners, or establishing an export trade.
39
Dudley's 1622 ironworks patent, for example, explained that the new
method,
will not only in itself tend to the public good thereof, but
also thereby the great expense and waste of timber and
wood converted into charcoal and consumed upon iron
works will be much abated, and the remnant of wood and
timber within this land will be much preserved and
increased; of the want whereof not only ourself, in respect
of provision for our shipping and otherwise, but also our
subjects, for many necessary uses, are very sensible.
40
The recitations of utility and the "consideration" promised by
patentees were by no means only ceremonial. Early patents were not
granted on demand. They involved real discretion and consideration
on the part of the crown as to the benefits involved and the possible
effects on various interests.41 There is no need to idealize the picture
and assume that the crown always considered the public good rather
than narrow political and personal interests and goals. Patent grants
were neither immune from criticism nor always regarded as
justifiable by contemporaries. Yet both the grant decisions and
attacks on such decisions occurred within the privilege framework.42
On the other side of the equation were the privileges granted to
the patentee. These, too, were crafted in a particularistic, case-
specific manner. On some general level, all invention patent
privileges were the same; in that they all granted exclusivity in the
exercise of some trade or economic activity for a limited period. On
a more specific level, however, the privileges varied greatly. 43 For
39. E. W. Hulme, On the Consideration of the Patent Grant, Past and
Present, 13 LAW Q. REV. 313, 315 (1897). For a survey of the changing
character of the social benefits promised by patentees from the middle of the
seventeenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, see also MACLEOD,
supra note 29, at 158-81.
40. The patent is reproduced in THOMAS WEBSTER, REPORTS AND NOTES
OF CASES ON LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS 14 (London, Thomas
Blenkarn 1844).
41. See MACLEOD, supra note 29, at 12.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 170-183.
43. Hulme, supra note 21, at 44-51.
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example, the exact economic activity in which the patentee had
exclusivity was specifically defined in each grant.44 Sometimes there
were geographical limitations to the privileges that covered only
certain parts of England.45 At other times, the privileges included
exemptions from guild or other restrictions and conferred unique
powers, such as the right to take professional workers of a certain
kind for reasonable wages.46 Other patents included the right to enter
some private properties.47  All invention patent privileges were
limited in time, but the duration varied widely.48 A 1571 grant for
making "Turkye haftes," for example, had a term of six years,
49
while a 1577 grant for "making sulphur, brimstone, and oils" had a
term of thirty.
Many sixteenth and seventeenth century English patents had
"working clauses." 51 A working clause obliged the patentee to put
the invention into practice, usually within a prescribed period.52 The
sanction for non-compliance was "avoidance," or nullification of the
patent.53 Moreover, patents with working clauses often required the
patentee to produce goods of a certain quality and sell them within
certain price limits.54 A typical example is George Gyplin and Peter
Stoughberken's 1563 ten-year patent to make ovens and furnaces,
which stipulated that the grant would be void if the patentees failed
44. Id.
45. E.g., id. at 45 (discussing a 1571 grant to Rd. Dyer for the making of
"earthen pots to hold fire for seething meat" that covered "London and a three-
mile radius"); id. at 48 (discussing a 1585 grant for the making of white salt
was confined to Lyn, Regis and Boston).
46. The 1564 patent to Cornelius de Vos for the making of alum and
copper, for example, conferred the right "to take up workmen at reasonable
wages, together with all materials requisite for the manufacture." Hulme,
supra note 19, at 146-47. A 1565 patent for the making of Spanish leather
exempted the patentees from a law prohibiting the export of leather. Id. at 147.
47. For example, a 1562 patent to John Medley for mine drainage included
clauses "regulating the compensation to be paid for entering upon abandoned
properties." Id. at 146.
48. Hulme, supra note 21, at 44-51; see also Hulme, supra note 19, at 145-
50.
49. Hulme, supra note 21, at 45.
50. Id. at 47.
51. Hulme, supra note 19, at 143.
52. Davies, supra note 22, at 100.
53. Id. at 101.
54. Id. at 105.
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to put the grant into practice within two months, or prove
extortionate in their charges. 5 5 One of the versions of the Smalt
patent required its patentee "to make sufficient quantity of the said
smalt to serve for the use of this our kingdom, and to serve the same
with smalt as good and as cheap as the like brought from beyond the
seas, within the space of seven years."56
Some early patent grants were dependent on actual quality
inspection by official representatives, either ex-ante as a
demonstration that the alleged invention actually delivered the
promised results, 57 or ex-post as an ongoing regulation.
58
Another brand of patent clauses known as revocation clauses
gradually became widespread and supplanted working clauses.
59
The first clause of this kind was introduced in a 1575 patent to
Holmes and Frampton. By the second half of the seventeenth
century, revocation clauses "became a fixed feature of all patents of
invention and remained as such down to modem times." 61  A
revocation clause was a general escape clause. It usually stated that
the crown or its arm, the Privy Council, had the power to revoke a
patent upon proof that it was "inconvenient or prejudicial to the
realm. ' '62 This term covered issues like novelty and priority of
55. Hulme, supra note 19, at 146.
56. WEBSTER, supra note 40, at 11. Smalt is described in an earlier version
of the patent as "a certain blue stuff ... commonly used by painters and
limners." Id. at 9.
57. Hulme, supra note 19, at 145. A 1561 grant for making "white sope"
mandated that "the soap, which is to be of the white hard variety, shall be as
good and fine as is made in the Sope house of Triana or Syvile." Id. The
patentees were bound to submit their wares for the inspection of the municipal
authorities. Id.
58. Id. at 146 (describing a 1562 patent with regulation clauses).
59. Davies, supra note 22, at 102.
60. Id. at 102 n.60.
61. Id. at 103. According to one author, revocation clauses authorizing the
Privy Council to revoke patents were inserted in the patent grants until 1902.
See id.; WILLIAM MARTIN, THE ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM 16 (1904)
(discussing the Patent Act of 1902, which gave the Privy Council statutory
revocation power).
62. Davies, supra note 22, at 102-03. For the exact phrasing of the clause,
see also 11 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 426 n.6
(1924).
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invention. 63  Yet it also included "any failure to introduce an
invention within a reasonable period ' ' 64 and many other specific
"abuses." Hence, the inconveniency ground for revocation was often
the basis for a substantive and comprehensive policy assessment of
particular patent grants.
65
The records of the Privy Council provide many examples of
discussions of a patent's inconvenience, either prior to the grant or at
a later time as part of a revocation process. 66 Traswell's patent for a
mill to grind corn and drain mines, for example, was challenged in
1660 because Traswell allegedly was not the real inventor, and
because he was granted a patent that "he did not thoroughly
understand, or could put into practise."67  Likewise, Rersby and
Strickland's patent for steel making was attacked in 1665 because
"neither of the patentees had any experience in the art, or had ever
publicly exercised the same." 68 Another example is Garill's patent
application for his method of casting gold and silver ingots. Critics
argued that it "will be hurtful to trade, and deprive many hundreds of
their Labour and lyvelyhood," and "will minister great occasion of
counterfeyting of moneys and so become a publique Mischief.,
69
In short, Privy Council proceedings were a public forum that
assessed the policy considerations behind specific patents. The
review of patents was not limited to interpreting and applying a
standard set of patentability criteria, but rather extended to a process
of public deliberation of the interests, policies, and social costs and
benefits underlying specific grants. The line between an unlawful
patent that did not meet a general patentability requirement and an
63. For the emergence of these requirements for the validity of a patent see
infra discussion accompanying notes 111-112 and 118; see also Davies, supra
note 22, at 103-04.
64. Davies, supra note 22, at 102.
65. Holdsworth explains that in such proceedings, the Council decided such
questions as, which claimant was the first inventor, whether the invention was
really new, and whether it was in the public interest to grant a patent.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 62, at 426 n.6; see also Davies, supra note 22, at
103-04 (stating other grounds on which the Council might revoke a patent).
66. Hulme, supra note 39, at 313-15.
67. E. Wyndham Hulme, Privy Council Law and Practice of Letters Patent
for Invention from the Restoration to 1794 (pt. 1), 33 LAW Q. REv. 63, 63-64
(1917).
68. Id. at 68.
69. Id. at 67.
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inconvenient patent that simply embodied bad public policy, to the
extent it existed, was extremely blurry.
70
All of those institutional practices combined to produce the
"patent deal." The patent was conceived as a particularistic deal
between the crown, representing the public interest, and the
patentee. 71 The patentee had no initial right to receive a patent.
Rather, the patentee offered particular benefits to the public and
petitioned the crown for specific privileges in consideration. 72 The
king used his discretionary prerogative power to decide whether the
public interest justified the deal and what its specific terms should
be.73 Moreover, even when a deal of this kind was struck and a
patent was granted, the patent was still subject to possible future
reassessments of the policy justifications supporting it in the form of
Privy Council proceedings. These could lead to revocation.
2. The Emergence of Patent Law
The origin of Anglo-American patent law is usually traced to the
1624 Statute of Monopolies 74 and a handful of monumental common
law decisions from the early seventeenth century.75 Did those early
beginnings of patent law bring about a fundamental change in the
institutional model of patents? Adam Mossoff recently argued that
"the Statute of Monopolies represents the first definitive step toward
the shift away from royal prerogative and privileges to common law
70. Similarly, when patents were reviewed in Parliament in 1621, a blurry
distinction between "contrary to law" and "inconvenient" was employed and
hence infringed on the rights of subjects. According to this distinction, an
illegal patent was one that was contrary to a strict legal requirement. See
Elizabeth Read Foster, The Procedure of the House of Commons Against
Patents and Monopolies 1621-1624, in CONFLICT IN STUART ENGLAND:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WALLACE NOTESTEIN 57, 74-75 (William Appleton
Aiken & Basil Duke Henning eds., 1960). Id. An inconvenient patent was one
that was clearly obnoxious and injurious to the best interest of the
commonwealth. Either one was a ground for attacking patents. Id. The
distinction was often blurred in parliamentary debates. See id.
71. See Hulme, supra note 39, at 313-15.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jam. 1, c. 3 (Eng.).
75. The main cases are Davenant v. Hurdis, Moore 576, 72 Eng. Rep. 769
(K.B. 1599) (known also as the Merchant Tailor's Case); Darcy v. Allen, 77
Eng. Rep 1620 (K.B. 1603) (known also as the Case of Monopolies); Cloth
Workers of Ipswich 78 Eng. Rep. 147 (K.B. 1615).
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and legal rights," and even that the statute "transformed this natural
right [of a patent] into a legal right, i.e., a civil right adjudicated in
civil society." 76 In fact, while the statute and the common law
decisions introduced some important developments, they did not
break with the patent-privileges framework and they certainly were
not a move in the direction of patent rights.
The Statute of Monopolies and the common law did not attempt
to establish a patent system. Nor did they create anything that could
even be called patent law. The fact that in later periods some
fundamentals of both the patent system and patent law emerged out
of those sources was, in the words of Christine MacLeod, "a quirk of
history." 77 The statute and the decisions were part of an ongoing
political and social struggle in seventeenth century England. They
can only be understood in the context of that conflict and the political
discourse of which they were an integral part.
One of the main axes of the conflict in tumultuous seventeenth
century England was the issue of the definition, scope and
limitations, if any, of royal power. Those who strove to minimize
royal power presented their struggle in terms of preserving "English
Liberties" and protecting the public good by prescribing limits to the
crown's power. As one contemporary put it, it was a struggle to
establish a commonwealth based on the principle that "common-
weals are not made for King's [sic], but Kings for common-weals."
78
Early in this struggle, the royal power to grant monopoly privileges
became a focal point because it was situated at a major junction of
ideology and material interests.79
76. Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual
History 1550-1800, 52 HASTINGS L. J. 1255, 1272-73, 1300 (2001). Mossoff
seems quite aware of the fact that the statute was not "a radical break with past
policies." Id. at 1273. Nonetheless he asserts a move toward "patent rights."
Id. passim. Inasmuch as the argument refers to "legal rights" in the sense of
rights to receive a patent, it is simply wrong. None of the limited innovations
of the Statute of Monopolies implied in any way a move toward patent rights.
77. MACLEOD, supra note 29, at 15.
78. The citation is taken from Fuller's argument for the defendant in Darcy
v. Allen. 74 Eng. Rep. 1131, 1135 (K.B. 1603).
79. See HAROLD G. Fox, MONOPOLIES AND PATENTS: A STUDY OF THE
HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE PATENT MONOPOLY 92-112 (1947); MARK
KISHLANSKY, A MONARCHY TRANSFORMED: BRITAIN 1603-1714, at 98-100
(1996); MACLEOD, supra note 29, at 14-17.
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The basic ideological division on the question of royal power
was between an absolutist view of monarchical power and a rival
position that the crown's power was limited. 80  The absolutists
conceded that a king had to rule so to promote the public good, but
they envisioned him as the sole arbiter of the public good, and denied
that there was an external legitimate earthly power that could impose
limitations on his judgments or powers. 8 1 "'[A] Prerogative in point
of Government,"' in the words of a contemporary, could not "'be
restrained or bound even by Act of Parliament."
82
By contrast, an opposing position emerged that described the
king's powers as limited to boundaries imposed by the common good
and English liberties enforced by law. The law was envisioned as
actually limiting the King's prerogative and restricting it to its proper
zone.83 "That which the King would doe," said Sir George Croke,
"if it be against the common lawe or stattuts, the lawe doth not judge
to be a prerogative in the Kinge."
84
Thus, while absolutists saw the use of the prerogative in
granting patents as "plenarie fullnes of power," 85 their foes argued
that it was limited by law.86 "Kings cannot command ill, or unlawful
things," Sir Dudley Digges said in 1626. Hence, "whenever they
speak, though by Letters Patents, if the thing be evil, those Letters
Patent are void.",87 In the political thought and rhetoric of the time,
there emerged a distinction between "bad monopolies" and "good
monopolies." Bad monopolies that were accused of a variety of ills
were deemed prejudicial to the public good and to English liberties.
Their grant was thus void and outside the proper powers of the
crown. Good monopolies, usually presented as the exception, were
80. J.P. SOMMERVILLE, ROYALISTS AND PATRIOTS: POLITICS AND
IDEOLOGY IN ENGLAND, 1603-1640, at 35-41 (2d ed. 1999).
81. Id. at 37-43.
82. The speaker was Sir John Davies, Attorney General of Ireland. J.P.
Sommerville, The Ancient Constitution Reassessed: the Common Law, The
Court and the Languages of Politics in Early Modern England, in THE STUART
COURT AND EUROPE: ESSAYS IN POLITICS AND POLITICAL CULTURE 39, 63 (R.
Malcolm Smuts ed., 1996) (citations omitted).
83. SOMMERVILLE, supra note 80, at 40.
84. Id. at 97.
85. Sommerville, supra note 82, at 61 (citing Solicitor General Thomas
Fleming in Darcy v. Allen).
86. SOMMERVILLE, supra note 80, at 40.
87. Id. at 97.
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beneficial to the public and accordingly were within the powers of
the king to grant.8 8  As one member of the Long Parliament
summarized, "[p]atents are Lawfull which are nott ad Damnum
Populi.
' 89
Discussions of patents for invention were part of this general
discourse on monopolies. Like other royal grants of privilege, they
were analyzed and argued in terms of abuse versus lawful use of
royal prerogative, and public detriment versus public good.
Parliament and the common law courts were the two main arenas in
which the monopolies were attacked. The two lasting products of
those institutions-the Statute of Monopolies9" and the common law
decisions-were clear manifestations of the ideological framework
described here.
Neither the statute nor the common law cases were mainly
preoccupied with patents for invention. The court cases involved
various non-invention monopolies whose validity was attacked. The
very assertion of jurisdiction to review royal grants stood in contrast
to the extreme absolutist view.91 The courts' decisions and the
arguments of counsel went further in internalizing the structure of the
political discourse on monopolies, however. 92 The fundamental
common law criterion for reviewing the validity of monopoly grants
came to be whether the grant served the public good. According to
this, rule a grant that was assumed to be prejudicial to the public
good was contrary to law, and thus invalid. Such conclusions were
often softened rhetorically using the rather fictional form of "the king
was deceived in his grant."
88. Fox, supra note 79, at 165-66.
89. Id. at 165.
90. During certain periods Parliament was the main forum for attacking
monopoly patents. Such attacks were held not only in parliamentary debates
and general bills but also through investigations of specific patent grants and a
procedure of "grievances." The procedure of examining patent grievances did
not maintain a clear distinction between a legislative and an adjudicative
function. Rather Parliament and its committees: (i) reviewed the lawfulness
and the "convenience" of specific patents; (ii) summoned and questioned
witnesses; (iii) heard arguments from -parties; (iv) determined facts; and (v)
issued judgments. See Foster, supra note 70, at 75-76.
91. Fox, supra note 79, at 95.
92. Id. at 165.
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In Darcy v. Allin,9 3 the best known and most influential of the
early common law cases, both parties argued in exactly these terms.
Nicholas Fuller, who represented the defendant, captured this joint
framework when he presented the legal test for the validity of a
monopoly in the form of a syllogism:
Major: All patents made for the general good of the
realm may restrain some subjects in their
particular trades lawfully.
Minor: But this patent is made for the general good
of the realm.
Conclusion: Therefore this patent may restrain some in
their particular trades lawfully.
94
This was exactly the structure of the political discourse of
monopolies. Darcy v. Allen and the emerging common law
internalized and popularized the distinction between lawful
monopolies beneficial to the public and unlawful monopolies that
were beyond the prerogative power.
93. 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (1603) (Other reports of this case use various
spellings of the defendant's name, i.e., Allen and Allein. Coke was the only
reporter to use the name The Case of Monopolies. 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (1603).
For consistency purposes, this article will refer hereinafter to the case as Darcy
v. Allen.) Jacob Corre challenged the almost mythological status of Darcy v.
Allen as a decisive blow against the royal prerogative by the common law
courts. Jacob I. Corre, The Argument, Decision and Reports ofDarcy v. Allen,
45 EMORY L.J. 1261, 1261 (1996). Corre shows that the judgment against the
patentee (Darcy) was delivered with no judicial opinion. Id. The arguments
were complex and involved many grounds for rejecting Darcy's suit. Id. at
1265. In the absence of judicial reasons, Corre explains, it is impossible to
know to what degree, if at all, the decision challenged the prerogative grant
power. Id. The later fame of the case arose mainly from Coke's report that
was published years later and was heavily synthesized by his anti-monopoly
perspective. See id. at 1263-64. Coke, who as Attorney General represented
Darcy, included in the report as the opinion of the court a summary of what he
claimed to be an oral communication to him from one of the judges. Id. The
point was well taken. Nevertheless, whatever the judicial reasons were as
reported, Darcy v. Allen remains an important landmark. At the very least,
reports of the case reveal the way emerging common law thought about
monopolies was synthesized and presented by a host of important and
influential reporters who published their accounts years after the decision.
94. 74 Eng. Rep. at 1136. The problem with the patent at issue, Fuller
explained, was that the minor proposition was false. Id.
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The 1624 Statute of Monopolies followed an identical pattern.
95
The statute was a product of one of the rounds of the conflict over
royal power that took place in the early 1620s. During its sessions,
Parliament dealt individually with a flood of grievances related to
monopolies. 96 It also tried to impose a broader ban on royal grants in
the form of a general statute. The statute closely followed the
rule/exception and the bad monopolies/good monopolies distinctions
of the political and common law discourse. Section I, which was the
heart of the statute, declared that "all Monapolyes and all
Commissions Graunts Licences Charters and letters patents" are
"contrary to the Lawes of this Realme, and so are and shalbe utterlie
void and of none effecte." 97 Section III ordered that no person be
able to use or exercise such monopolies. 98  Section II and IV
established in clear terms the jurisdiction of the common law courts
to examine and determine the validity of monopolies.99 All ten other
sections enumerated various exceptions to and exemptions from the
general ban on monopolies.!
00
What was the place of invention patents within the newly
appearing' 0 ' legal framework of monopolies? Such patents
constituted, at least initially, little more than a footnote in the scheme
of the Statute of Monopolies and the common law decisions. In a
few of the cases, hypothetical invention patents within certain
limitations were mentioned as examples of lawful monopolies that
would presumably serve the public good. 10 2 Similarly, patents for
invention were added to the statute late in the legislative process'
0 3
95. See Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jam. 1, c. 3 (Eng.).
96. See Foster, supra note 70.
97. Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jam. 1, c. 3 (Eng.).
98. Id. § III.
99. Id. §II&IV.
100. Id.
101. Neither the Statute of Monopolies nor the common law standards were
immediately strictly adhered to in practice. Their actual acceptance and
implementation was gradual and protracted. See Mossoff, supra note 76, at
1276-77.
102. See Cloth Workers of Ipswich, 78 Eng. Rep. 147 (K.B. 1615); Darcy v.
Allen, Noy 173, 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B. 1602).
103. Chris R. Kyle, But a New Button to an Old Coat: The Enactment of the
Statute of Monopolies, 21 James I cap. 3., 19 J. LEGAL HIST. 203, 208, 214
(1998).
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as one exception, among many others, to the general ban on
monopoly patents. 1
0 4
In some respects, the statute and the common law introduced
important modifications to the patent grant's institutional model.
Most significantly, the royal prerogative to grant patents, previously
assumed to be unlimited, was now circumscribed to a limited zone
defined by law. 10 5 Only those monopolies that fell within the
statutory or common law exceptions were lawful. Whenever the
boundaries were exceeded the monopoly grant was deemed illegal
and void.1 6
Additionally, the definition of invention patents as a discrete
category of exceptions had significant implications. This carving out
of the previously undistinguished group of patents contributed to
their differentiation as a subset of grants with special characteristics.
Moreover, for the first time, the legal definitions created general,
uniform criteria that an invention patent had to satisfy in order to be
valid. The Statute of Monopolies defined a lawful invention patent
as follows:
[A]ny tres Patents and Graunts of Privilege for the tearme
of fowerteene yeares or under, hereafter to be made of the
sole working or makinge of any manner of new
Manufactures within this Realme, to the true and first
Inventor and Inventors of such Manufactures, which others
at the tyme of makinge such tres Patents and Graunts shall
not use, soe as alsoe they be not contrary to the Lawe nor
mischievous to the State, by raisinge prices of Comodities
at home, or hurt of Trade, or generallie inconvenient.'
0 7
Many of those criteria were based on the existing common law
decisions. 0 8  In particular the statute adopted the common law
requirements: (1) that the "manufacture" invented not be used by
others at the time of the grant; (2) that the patentee be the first
104. Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jam. 1, c. 3 (Eng.).
105. Kyle, supra note 103, at 216-17.
106. Id.
107. Statute of Monopolies, 1624,21 Jam. 1, c. 3 (Eng.).
108. For the common law definitions of lawful invention patents, see Darcy
v. Allen, 74 Eng. Rep. at 1139; see also Cloth Workers of Ipswich, 78 Eng.
Rep. 148 (K.B. 1615).
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inventor; (3) and that the grant be limited in time, formalized in the
statute to a cap of fourteen years.'
0 9
Those were important developments, but they did not imply in
any way a move toward patent rights. To begin with, the statute and
the decisions were grounded in the period's political discourse on
monopolies. The guiding principle of that discourse was not patent
rights, but rather the rights of Englishmen to be free of abusive
patents. Indeed, this was the essence of the new, uniform legal
criteria for a valid invention patent. In fact, these were not
patentability criteria, but rather non-patentability criteria. The new
standards did not define when one had a right to a patent, but rather
when a lawful patent could be granted."10 It was not the right to
receive a patent that was enforceable in a court of law, but only the
right to invalidate a patent that did not meet the requirements. 11
In two important respects, the decision to grant a patent
remained a case-specific, discretionary policy decision grounded in
royal prerogative. First, the legal framework created outer limits to
the royal grant power. 12 Beyond those boundaries all grants were
void. The underlying logic was that whenever one of those
requirements was not fulfilled, an irrebuttable presumption arose that
the grant was prejudicial to the public good. Yet within the allowed
zone, the decision to grant patents remained as discretionary and
case-specific as ever. There the crown remained free to consider and
decide what kind of grant would serve the public good, and whether
a specific grant would do so.
Second, and more subtly, the standard patentability criteria
themselves were saturated with the concept of patents as tailored
109. The novelty and first invention requirements were different than the
modem ones. They were based on a concept of invention whose focus was the
introduction in practice of an economic activity not practiced in England at the
time, rather than on technological discoveries. See Hulme, supra note 19, at
153; Fox, supra note 79, at 62.
110. See Walterscheid, supra note 22, at 874-76, 879.
111. See id.
112. See Mossoff, supra note 76, at 1272; Walterscheid, supra note 22, at
874-76, 880; cf Kyle, supra note 103, at 216-17 (arguing that the Monopolies
Act did not limit the royal prerogative and was "simply a declaratory statement
of the common law position and the King's own views").
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decisions involving case-specific policy determinations."13 While
those criteria imposed external limits on royal power in the name of
the public good, many of them turned out to be merely triggers for
substantial case-specific policy discussions and determinations.1
14
A sample of the seven conditions for a valid invention patent
listed in Coke's authoritative commentary on the Statute of
Monopolies demonstrates this point." The requirement that the
patent not be "to the hurt of trade," 116 which Coke lifted from the
statute's language but did not explain, was an obvious call for a case-
specific, open-ended policy calculus. So was the "generally
inconvenient" 11 7 condition. Here Coke's example of inconveniency
was the invention of a fulling mill that could replace "labours of
fourscore men, who got their livings by it."118  Despite the
innovation, a patent for such a machine would be invalid "for it was
holden inconvenient to turn so many labouring men to idlenesse."
1 9
Coke read into the requirement that a patent not be "mischevious to
the State" by raising of prices of commodities the condition that for
"every such new manufacture that deserves a priviledge, there must
be urgens necessitas, and evidens utilitas."'
120
Many of the general patentability criteria, in short, were
channels for case-specific policy determinations, rather than standard
requirements to be applied uniformly in all cases. The subtle change
was that these final policy determinations were to be made not by the
granting authority, but by the institution that was empowered to
113. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 183 (photo.
reprint 1985) (1817) (listing the seven properties that items to be patented must
have).
114. See Fox, supra note 79, at 102-08.
115. COKE, supra note 113, at 183. Coke was one of the main sponsors and
framers of the statute. For a more detailed elaboration of Coke's commentary
on the statute see, Walterscheid, supra note 22, at 876-80. Coke was one of
the main sponsors and framers of the statute.




120. Id. at 183.
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enforce the patentability criteria, whether it be the courts or other
institutions. 2
1
The emerging legal framework of invention patents remained
rooted in the privilege model on two levels: (1) the character of the
power to grant patents within the lawful zone of valid patents, and
(2) the character of the general patentability criteria defining the
external limits of that zone. The future development of patents
would evolve within those two dimensions.
3. Patent Rights? Patents Through the End of
the Eighteenth Century
The story of English monopoly grants after the Restoration is
one of a gradual decline in their significance as major tools for
dispensing royal policies and of a resultant growing disinterest in
them on the part of the crown. 122 A political climate that made
extensive use of royal monopolies dangerous 123 and a changing
theory and practice of the desirable channels for governmental
action' 24 resulted in a constant decline of monopoly grants.1
25
There were two implications of this decline. First, the myriad of
forms of industrial and trade monopolies that proliferated during the
early seventeenth century was gradually fading away, while patents
for invention under the framework of the Statue of Monopolies rose
to the status of the most common and significant category of patent
grants.126 Second, the demise in the importance of monopoly patents
entailed a growing disinterest on the part of government. This
amounted to a general approach of indifference, which, in turn, led to
a lack of thorough and strict scrutiny of the public benefits and the
policy considerations involved with specific grants of invention
patents. 128 Except for cases that involved some issue deemed to be
121. The other main institutional center for the ex-post enforcement and
evaluation of patents was the Privy Council. See supra discussion
accompanying notes 59-70; infra text accompanying notes 150-161.
122. See MACLEOD, supra note 29, at 20-39.
123. One contemporary summed it up in 1664 by remarking that the
previous king had lost his head by granting patents such as the one that was
proposed at that time. See Fox, supra note 79, at 156 n.14.
124. See id. at 157.
125. Id. at 154.
126. Id. at 157.
127. See Id. at 154-56; MACLEOD, supra note 29, at 20, 40.
128. See MACLEOD, supra note 29, at 41.
Fall 2004] THE COMMODIFICA TION OF PATENTS
of direct and substantial relevance to a national interest, patents for
invention came to be granted as a matter of routine and standard
procedure with no specific investigation and discretion.129
The result of these developments was a growing gulf between
"law in books" and "law in action."' 130  Law in the books-legal
doctrines as found in the formal sources of law--did not change at
all for more than a century. It continued to be premised on the
traditional concept of patents as case-specific, discretionary policy
instruments under the post-Statute of Monopolies framework. Law
in action, however-the actual social practices of the grant-
changed and gradually moved away from the privilege framework. 
131
The procedure of patent petitions was governed by the Clerks
Act of 1535.132 The statute's original purpose, stated in its preamble,
was to finance unsalaried government clerks.' 33 It created a complex
and relatively expensive bureaucratic maze that prospective
patentees had to navigate on their way to their desired patent. 134 In
later times this procedure received a fair amount of criticism for its
obsoleteness and the procedural troubles it piled before petitioners.1
35
129. Id. at 41-47.
130. See generally Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM.
L. REV. 12 (1910) (illustrating the difference between law in books and law in
action).
131. See generally MACLEOD, supra note 29, at 49-55.
132. Clerks Act, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, c. 2 (Eng.).
133. See id.; MACLEOD, supra note 29, at 40 (describing modifications to the
patent system to "bring more certainty into areas notoriously bereft of statutory
guidelines").
134. The procedure involved ten separate stages taking place at different
offices in London between which the applicant had to transfer the application,
all involving substantial fees and time. See COULTER, supra note 20, at 16-18.
Patent agents as a professional class appeared only at the second quarter of the
nineteenth century, though those who had the means could hire others to take
care of some of the bureaucratic errands involved earlier. See Dirk Van Zyl
Smit, "Professional" Patent Agents and the Development of the English Patent
System, 13 INT'L J. Soc. L. 79, 82 (1985); H.I. DUTrrON, THE PATENT SYSTEM
AND INVENTIVE AcTIvITY DURING THE INDUSTRIAL REvOLUTION, 1750-1852,
at 86-96 (1984).
135. Charles Dickens satirized in his writing the clumsy and costly patent
procedure and all the bureaucrats involved which "[n]o man in England could
get a Patent for Indian-rubber band, or an iron-hoop, without feeing all of
them. Some of them, over and over again." See CHARLES DICKENS, A Poor
Man's Tale of Patent, reprinted in THE WORKS OF CHARLES DICKENS 113,
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Still, the main pitfalls were procedural. Unless a patent was
challenged, only one out of the ten bureaucratic stages involved was
more than a mere formality.' 36 The only substantive review was the
report of the law officers, either the Attorney General or the Solicitor
General, regarding the fulfillment of the Statute of Monopolies
requirements. 137 Even during this stage the system was, for the most
part, based on formal procedure rather than substantive discretion. In
the usual case, the law officers did little to scrutinize petitioners'
declarations of novelty, utility, and the expected social and economic
effects of the patent.
138
This bureaucratic momentum gradually developed into a general
governmental approach to the grant of patents that Christine
MacLeod labeled, somewhat misleadingly, "laissez-faire."'139  In
most cases, petitioners who managed to clear all the formal,
procedural hurdles received their patents with little investigation or
discretion on the part of government officials. 14 0 Thus, in practice
the system resembled a patent rights model. Although no person
could claim or enforce a right to receive a patent, patents were
usually issued in a standard procedure that involved no case-specific
governmental discretion, and which created an increasingly standard
set of entitlements. Thus, the seeds of the transformation of patents
from particularistic privileges into standard rights were sown as a
byproduct of neglect. The actual practice of patent grants moved inch
by inch toward standardization, without any conscious planning or
central direction.
The extent of this transformation of practice should not be
exaggerated, however. The claim that the eighteenth century saw
"the evolution of patents from royal prerogative to legally recognized
119 (Andrew Lang ed., 1900); CHARLES DICKENS, LITrLE DORRIT ch. 10
(Cornwall Press 1951) (1857).
136. See MACLEOD, supra note 29, at 40-41.
137. Seeid. at41.
138. See id. at 41-42.
139. Id. at 47. The term laissez-faire is misleading because the granting of
patents constituted, then as today, active involvement on the part of the state in
market conditions. The term simply points to the fact that in the common case
government officials did little investigation and hardly weighed any policy
considerations before they authorized such state involvement.
140. See id. at 40-41.
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property right"'14 1 is at best an overstatement. First, the grant
practices themselves remained equivocal in this respect. Beginning
in late seventeenth century, invention patents were often granted with
little substantive investigation. 142 This approach changed when a
specific important state interest, such as the revenue or the military,
was found to be directly implicated. 143  In such instances, the
relevant government officials tended to become much more engaged
in examining patent petitions, scrutinizing the social benefits offered,
and drawing the grant's contours carefully.1
44
More importantly, the passive approach dominated only as long
as no interested party objected to a particular patent grant. When
there was an objection, it usually prompted the law officers to
demand more information and conduct a more thorough
investigation.145 Furthermore, objections either ex ante-prior to the
grant--or ex post-after it was complete-often resulted in a review
process in the Privy Council. 146  Such procedures had all the
traditional characteristics of case-specific policy deliberations.
147 In
fact, the default attitude of initial passivity in the grant procedure was
often explicitly justified on the basis of the always-present option of
turning to the Privy Council if the patent was found contrary to law• • .148
or inconvenient.
141. Mossoff, supra note 76, at 1258.
142. There are difficulties in assessing the exact frequency and degree of
official examination mainly due to a lack of empirical information. One
explanation for this lack of empirical data is that no reasons were provided for
a patent application's rejection. See MACLEOD, supra note 29, at 42. The
extent of scrutiny of patent applications also varied somewhat according to the
persons who occupied the relevant legal positions. See id. at 44-45.
143. See id.
144. MacLeod explains that "[i]n those areas where its interests were directly
involved, the crown was quite unscrupulous in its administration of patents."
Id. at 36. Naval and military supplies "remained an area in which the usually
laissez-faire attitudes of eighteenth-century administrations regarding patents
were compromised." Id. at 37; see id. at 34-38.
145. See id. at 46-47.
146. See id.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 30-38.
148. In 1663, for example, Lord Treasurer Southampton supported his
recommendation of Garill's patent application by saying that "'in case any
unseen abuse be found out,' it could be rescinded by the Council." MACLEOD,
supra note 29, at 47 (quoting PUB. RECORDS OFFICE, Doc. No. SP 29.82, fol.
32 (Eng.)).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:177
Most scholarly accounts accept E. W. Hulme's description of
the continuous jurisdictional struggle between the courts and the
Privy Council. 149 By these accounts, the struggle ended in a
dramatic case from 1753,150 which "led to a reconsideration, from a
constitutional standpoint, of the Council's jurisdiction," and the
decision of the council to "divest itself of its functions."'' By all
indications, this narrative is simply wrong.
The evidence regarding the decline of Privy Council jurisdiction
is sketchy at the moment, and it will take a thorough investigation of
the records to reconstruct the exact process. 52 Even on the basis of
current sparse evidence, however, two things seem clear. First, the
relations between the Privy Council and the common law courts in
the context of patents were more complex than a continuous conflict
that ended only when the council finally submitted. While we do
know of instances of conflict, 153 there is also much evidence of the
council referring parties to the courts of law to try their claims.'
54
Thus, alongside conflict there was coexistence and even some
symbiosis between the two institutions.
Second, it does not appear that Privy Council jurisdiction over
patents and the discretionary nature of the patent grant that it
preserved ended abruptly in the middle of the eighteenth century. In
149. See Mossoff, supra note 76, at 1286; MACLEOD, supra note 29, at 59-
60; 11 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 62, at 426-27.
150. Mossoff provides a clear and detailed summary of the 1753 incident.
Mossoff, supra note 76, at 1285-86.
151. E. Wyndham Hulme, Privy Council Law and Practice of Letters Patent
for Invention from the Restoration to 1794 (pt. 2), 33 LAw. Q. REv. 180, 194
(1917).
152. All materials from the Privy Council activities during the eighteenth
century are available only as original archival records in England. This
inaccessibility probably explains the blind scholarly following of Hulme's
mistaken or simply misleading description.
153. See, for example, a 1626 Privy Council stay for common law patent
proceedings described in Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the
United States Patent Law: Antecedents (pt. 3), 77 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 771, 774
(1995). In 1624, while explaining the explicit designation of common law
jurisdiction in the Statute of Monopolies, Glanville, a member of the House of
Commons, commented that "heretofore when a man would speak against a
patent of monopoly, it must be before a council table and there have a
perpetual emparlance and could not have the trial of it by common law ...
Foster, supra note 70, at 79 n.7.
154. See Hulme, supra note 67, at 72-73 (describing two patent disputes,
one from 1677 and the other from 1680 that were referred to the courts of law).
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fact, although Hulme wrote that the 1753 incident led to a divestment
of the Privy Council powers in the field of patents, his own accounts
detail subsequent Privy Council patent proceedings. 155 Existing
research shows that such proceedings persisted at least up to 1794.Isg
Moreover, even in later times there seems to have been no
apprehension inside the legal community that the Privy Council had
divested itself of its patent jurisdiction. 5 7 Inclusion of revocation
clauses that formally declared Privy Council jurisdiction to revoke
patents continued until 1902.158 As late as 1847, in one of the
earliest patent law treatises, W.M. Hindmarch devoted a section to
"the Revocation of a Patent by the Queen or Privy Council."'159
Hindmarch described such proceedings in terms that correspond to
the traditional privilege concept: "The grant of a patent is a matter of
grace and favour and therefore.., the Crown may annex any
conditions it pleases to the grant... with the view of enabling the
Crown to determine any illegal grant which may be unadvisedly
155. See Hulme, supra note 151, at 191-93. The answer may be found in
Hulme's explanation that after 1754 the Council limited itself "strictly to the
performance of duties imposed by the defeasance clause in Letters Patent." Id.
at 193-94. This "defeasance clause" is what I refer to as a revocation clause.
See supra text accompanying notes 59-65. Again it is not entirely clear what
Hulme meant. However, if the argument is about a division of labor between
the courts and the council-the former dealing with the legal patent
requirement and the latter exercising its jurisdiction to revoke inconvenient
patents, then it is plain to see that, as long as such proceedings in the council
survived, much of the discretionary flavor of patents persisted. It was exactly
the revocation authority on the basis of the open-ended "inconveniency"
ground that preserved the traditional character of patents as discretionary
privileges.
156. According to Hulme (who searched the records up to 1810) and Davies,
the last application was revoked by the Privy Council in 1794. Davies reports
that the last record of actual revocation by the council is from 1779. See
Hulne, supra note 151, at 193; Davies, supra note 22, at 103.
157. See Mossoff, supra note 76, at 1286.
158. See Davies, supra note 22.
159. W.M. HINDMARCH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO PATENT
PRIVILEGES FOR THE SOLE USE OF INVENTIONS, AND THE PRACTICE OF
OBTAINING LETTERS PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 431 (London, Stevens &
Norton & Benning 1846); see also RICHARD GODSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS AND COPYRIGHT 49-50 (London,
Joseph Butterworth & Son 1823).
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made, without allowing the public to be put to the trouble or cost of
resisting the unlawful patent.'
' 60
The general picture seems to be one of gradual decline of the
Privy Council's role that lasted into the nineteenth century,
accompanied by a long period of ambiguity. In this slow
fossilization process, Privy Council proceedings slowly lost their
practical and semantic importance in the patent system. By the mid-
nineteenth century all that remained were hollow shells that the
lawyers occasionally still referred to.
By the end of the eighteenth century English patents were far
from having completed the transition from patent privileges to patent
rights. The picture is rather one of flux and ambiguity as well as of
divisions between competing views and different layers of discourse.
On the level of popular references and learned treatments of the
patent system, new concepts of patent rights supported by ideological
justifications started to appear in the late eighteenth century. The
inventor Joseph Bramah, for example, wrote in a 1797 letter to James
Eyre, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, that "invention... those
efforts of the mind and understanding... may justly be denominated
the right of every individual, ... unconnected with any political
regulation."'
6 1
One should be wary when reading such statements from
162contemporaries.. The terms "rights," "property," and "securing the
property" are often used by contemporaries in the context of patents
to mean no more than the traditional entitlement under the privilege
framework. A 1791 anonymous publication that defined patents as
"a grant of the crown substantiating private property" is a good
example.
163
160. HINDMARCH, supra note 159, at 431.
161. MACLEOD, supra note 29, at 199 (citing JOSEPH BRAMAH, A LETTER
TO THE RT HON. SIR JAMES EYRE 77 (London, J. Stockdale 1797)).
162. For a list of examples of the use of terms by contemporaries that fails to
be sensitive to such subtleties, see Mossoff, supra note 76, at 1295-96. For
examples of the use of terms such as "rights" by contemporaries insensitive to
such subtleties, see id.
163. MACLEOD, supra note 29, at 199 (citing EDWARD BEETHAM,
OBSERVATIONS ON THE UTILITY OF PATENTS 42 (4th ed., London, Ridgway,
1791); see also Mossoff, supra note 76, at 1301-02 (stating examples of mixed
and obscure use of the different concepts of rights, property and the protection
of patents).
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The ideological divisions of the time regarding patents are often
described in terms of a view of patents as natural rights, versus an
opposing view of patents as state created privileges. 164  This,
however, is only part of the picture. There were, in fact, two lines of
division that did not completely overlap. One division was between
those who claimed that patents were pre-political natural rights,
recognized but not created by the state, and their opponents who
viewed patents as state created entitlements. 165 There was a second
disagreement over whether patents should be privileges granted on a
case-specific basis by the crown, or general rights to which anyone
who met general patentability criteria should be entitled. 166  The
divisions with respect to these two different issues were not always
identical. Some of those who claimed that patents were natural
property rights did not seem to challenge the basic patent-privileges
framework. 16 7  Others sang the praises of a patent rights regime
under which the state had no discretion regarding the grant, and yet
adhered to a positivist concept of patents.
6 8
Whether it was from a natural rights or a positivist perspective,
some new voices that spoke in terms of patent rights began to appear
late in the century. Moreover, more learned theoretical references to
patents began to construct an elaborate ideological justification to a
system in which the sovereign did not make case specific policy
decisions in the grant of patents.' 69 Some were still complaining that
164. See DUTTON, supra note 134, at 18-19; Mossoff, supra note 76, at
1319-20.
165. See generally Mossoff, supra note 76 (arguing that while most
historians of patent law agree that natural rights theories played little or no part
in the development of patent law, in fact, there was substantial support for the
natural rights theory of patents as well as the theory that patentees were no
more than State issued privileges.).
166. See COULTER, supra note 20, at 80, 99-100.
167. See Mossoff, supra note 76, at 1256-57.
168. This view became popular mainly in the nineteenth century with the
rise of utilitarian thinkers who denounced the idea of natural rights as
"nonsense on stilts" and yet were in favor of a general patent regime based on
general patentability criteria rather than specific governmental discretion. See
COULTER, supra note 20, at 77-80. From this perspective, patents were state
created rights whose standard content and scope should be set (as a general ex
ante standard rather than a case specific-decision) as to serve the general social
welfare. For the views of Bentham and Mill on patents, see COULTER, supra
note 20, at 79-81; DUTTON, supra note 134, at 19-20.
169. See DUTTON, supra note 134, at 18-21.
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"it was supposed that enquiry would be made, whether [patents]
were deserved, before they were granted" and that "[l]ittle was it
imagined that the whole ceremony would be the paying the fees, and
taking the seal.' 170 Adam Smith, however, celebrated the very lack
of governmental discretion in the grant of patents, which he found to
be one of the only brands of harmless monopolies. 17 1 Smith never
clarified whether he was talking about the old privilege framework or
referring to a hypothetical system of patent rights. The quality he
admired in patents, however, was that it was the market rather than
government that determined the inventor's compensation. 172  As
Smith put it, "[f]or here, if the invention be good and such as is
profitable to mankind, he will probably make a fortune by it; but if it
be of no value he also will reap no benefit."'173 "[P]ecuniary
rewards," he wrote, "would hardly ever be so precisely proportiond
[sic] to the merit of the invention."
174
Thus, the traditional argument that patents are preferable to
other methods of rewarding and encouraging invention because they
cost government nothing started acquiring different tones. The
refined view not only recognized the cost advantage associated with
patents, but also saw as an advantage the fact that government did
not employ discrimination or discretion by evaluating the utility and
desirability of particular inventions, whose value was left to the
market. 175 In a 1774 pamphlet, one author explained that patents are
desirable because by using that method "the eventual utility of such
inventions is made the measure of reward."'176 Thus alongside
arguments about patent rights, an ideological justification of a regime
based on the market rather than government as the arbiter of value
began to appear.
Despite such new sentiments, the patent system's basic
institutional structure remained rooted in the privilege model well
170. 23 GENTLEMAN'S MAG. 235 (1753).





175. See generally MACLEOD, supra note 29, at 196.
176. Id. (quoting WILLIAM KENRICK, AN ADDRESS TO THE ARTISTS AND
MANUFACTURERS OF GREAT BRITAIN 20 (London, Printed for Messrs.
Domville et al. 1774)).
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into the nineteenth century. Those urging reform were the first to
admit as much. In 1829, a Mechanics' Magazine correspondent
noted that "[T]he almost annual attempt at amending the patent laws
are only so many trials to make the theory of privilege, and its
consequent practice, fit the universal feel of right; but the crooked
billet offers no fare that will fit."'
177
While some started thinking of and referring to patents as rights,
many others adhered to the privilege model. The legal community
was among those most resistant to change and most entrenched in the
old privilege framework. In 1790 Lord Chancellor Thurlow wrote in
dictum that "[i]f the King refused it [the patent], it would be upon
reasons very unfit for me or for any one to dispute, because it rests
entirely in his royal breast; and it cannot be in one more
honourable."' 178 Dictum it had to be, because apparently no one tried
to argue in court that he had a right to receive a patent or that the
crown could be enforced to issue one during this period. 
179
Virtually all commentators of the first patent treatises, which
were written in the early nineteenth century, continued to refer to
patents as a matter of royal "grace and favour" and explained that
their specific content was to be determined by royal discretion in
each case. 180 In his 1823 path breaking treatise on patents and
copyright, Richard Godson had a subsection entitled "No Right to
Demand Patent," which explained that:
there is not any clause or enactment, by which the subject
can demand them as a right. This great encouragement to
industry, this fruitful source of wealth, is still the free gift of
the King. It emanates from him as the Patron of Arts and
Sciences at the humble request of his subject; and it is as a
gracious favour that he extends this protection to the
inventor. 
181
As late as 1846, Hindmarch could explain in his treatise that
"inventors are never entitled as of right to letters patent, granting
177. 25 MECHANIC'S MAG. 229 (1836) (quoted in Van Zyl Smit, supra note
134, at 95).
178. ExParte O'Reily, 30 Eng. Rep. 259 (Ch. 1790).
179. See Walterscheid, supra note 18, (pt. 4) at 92.
180. See, e.g., HINDMARCH, supra note 159, at 4.
181. GODSON, supra note 159, at 47 (emphasis in original).
209
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them the sole use of their inventions, but they must obtain them from
the Crown by petition, and as a matter of grace and favour."'
182
These were not the kinds of statements that sometimes survive
as empty shells in the opening pages of legal treatises, echoing older
conceptions already superseded in actual doctrine. On the contrary,
these statements were well grounded in operable legal doctrines.
183
Patent doctrine underwent important changes in the late eighteenth
century. Those changes related to the concept of the invention, the
legal requirement of specification, and the consideration expected
from the patentee in the patent deal. 184 It had no bearing on the legal
model of patents as privileges.' 85 Thus Collier, who opened the
preface of his 1803 patent treatise by writing about "property" which
is "daily assuming new forms" and of the patent as an "honourable
reward of productive talent,"' 86 reverted to the traditional privilege
model when he started discussing actual doctrine.' 87 In complete
adherence to the familiar framework of case-specific royal discretion
exercised within a prescribed scope, he explained that patents are
granted as a matter of the royal prerogative of the king, who is "the
arbiter of commerce" to "such persons as he shall think proper."'
188
By the end of the eighteenth century, the institutional model of
patents as privileges was in a state of flux and ambiguity in England.
182. HINDMARCH, supra note 159, at 4 (emphasis in original).
183. See, e.g., GODSON, supra note 159, at 48 (stating that "proceedings are
narrowly inspected by the King's law officers before they are sanctioned by
the royal authority").
184. See Walterscheid, supra note 153, (pt. 3) at 792-802.
185. See id. at 792-93. Making a similar argument, Mossoff argues that the
late eighteenth century transformation of English patent law reflected a move
toward a Lockean conception of natural property rights. Inasmuch as the
argument is that judicial rhetoric was influenced by concepts taken from
Lockean natural rights thought, it seems plausible. However, it seems that
Mossoff occasionally argues a stronger claim, that "the eighteenth century is
the period in which patent doctrine is burned pure of its function as a tool of
royal prerogative." Mossoff, supra note 76, at 1320. This claim is simply
false.
186. JOHN DYER COLLIER, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW
INVENTIONS, at v, xiv (London, A. Wilson 1803).
187. Id. at 64-65.
188. Id. Regarding the term of the patent, Collier wrote that "motives may
arise which shall induce the king to limit his grant of letters patent in such
cases for a shorter term, but he cannot now extend them beyond the duration of
fourteen years." Id. at 70 (emphasis in original).
Fall 2004] THE COMMODIFICA TION OF PATENTS
Public discourse contained articulations of patents as rights and new
ideological justifications about the market as the proper arbiter of
value. Yet many other public pronouncements expressed adherence
to the traditional privilege model or simply remained obscure on the
subject. The administrative practices also created ambiguity, moving
in the direction of standardization while not altogether deserting the
discretionary privilege based practices. Legal doctrine and legal
thought changed little in this respect and remained the firmest
bastion of the traditional institutional model of patent privileges.
B. Colonial and State Patents
American colonial and state patents 189 were rudimentary Creole
versions of the English patent grant. In those American colonies,
and the states, that granted patents, the legislature assumed the role
of issuing grants that conferred exclusive privileges of various kinds
on specific individuals. 190 Each grant was an independent enactment
that came into being through a standard legislative process.' 9' These
grants were part of a larger arsenal of tactics that the government
employed to carry out its perceived power and duty to regulate the
economy in the name of the public good. 192 The variety of methods
included, inter alia, prizes, subsidies, payments of salaries to skilled
artisans, loans, permission to hold lotteries for raising funds,
exemptions from taxes and military service, and grants of limited
monopolies for various economic activities. 193  Monopoly grants
covered all kinds of enterprises, everything from mills, to iron works,
to the operation of ferries. 194 The occasional grants that involved
189. "Patents" is a misnomer for the grants of exclusivity that were granted
by colonial assemblies. Letters patent, as explained, were a form of the
exercise of the royal prerogative and hence only the King could grant them.
Nevertheless, I will use the term here for the sake of convenience. There is
only sparse and scattered evidence of royal letter patents for invention in the
American Colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See, e.g.,
BUGBEE, supra note 6, at 72.
190. See, e.g., P.J. FEDERICO, Colonial Monopolies and Patents, 11 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 358, 331-32 (1929).
191. Id. at 367.
192. JOHN J. McCUSKER & RUSSELL R. MENARD, THE ECONOMY OF
BRITISH AMERICA 1607-1789, at 331-32 (2d ed. 1991).
193. See id. at 96, 343; FEDERICO, supra note 190, at 360; BUGBEE, supra
note 6, at 57.
194. See FEDERICO, supra note 190, at 360-62.
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technological innovations or inventions in the modem sense were not
conceived of as a separate category.
One of the earliest grants issued in 1641 by the General Court of
Massachusetts captures the flavor of these patents:
Whereas Samu: Winslow hath made a [pro]position to this
Court to furnish the countrey w[i]th salt at more easy rates
then otherwise can bee had, & to make it by a meanes &
way w[hi]ch hitherto hath not bene discov[e]red; it is
therefore ordered, that if the said Samu: shall, w[i]thin the
space of one yeare, set upon the said worke, hee shall enjoy
the same, to him & his assosiat[e]s, for the space of 10
yeares, so as it shall not bee lawfull to any other p[er]son to
make salt after the same way during the said years;
p[ro]vided, nev[e]rthelesse, that it shall be lawfull for any
p[er]son to bring in any salt, or to make salt after any
oth[e]r way, dureing the said tearme. 1
95
Colonial grants were deeply rooted in the patent-privileges
model. Each grant was a specific discretionary decision by the
political representatives of the community. 196 The fact that the
colonial assembly, rather than the crown or some organ of the
executive, issued those grants emphasized their discretionary and
political character even more. 197 No one could assert a right for a
195. 1 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF MASSACHUSETTS
BAY IN NEW ENGLAND (1628-1686) 331 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston,
William White Press 1853) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR].
196. See FEDERICO, supra note 190, at 366.
197. It is an interesting fact that the colonial legislatures rather than the
governors or the councils came to exercise the power of granting local patents.
If a miniature version of the English patent grants had been followed, the
governor would have granted patents. However, it was local politics, material
conditions, and with time probably, ideology too, rather than logical
symmetries, that dictated otherwise. It would be useful to consider this in view
of what is known as the rise of the assemblies' thesis. The rise of the
assemblies' thesis highlights the process in which colonial assemblies
gradually came to hold and exercise powers and responsibilities much broader
than those allocated to them under the colonial government structure (and in
some aspects much broader even than equivalent parliamentary powers in
England). For a general discussion of the rise of the assemblies' thesis and
references, see Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to
Legislative Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1382, 1391 (1998); Jack P. Greene, Political Mimesis: A Consideration of the
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patent. Rather, one had to petition the legislature, offer specific
public benefits, and pray for a special enactment that would create
particular privileges.
The typical technical practices of the grants reflected and
created this privilege-based framework. Many of those practices
resembled the early English grants. Petitions to the legislatures
detailed particular public benefits an invention offered and asked for
case-specific privileges.' 99 Applicants typically elaborated specific
tangible benefits that their inventions offered, such as lower prices,
the supply of a scarce commodity, or labor savings. 20 0 The scope
and kind of privileges granted, the conditions imposed on the
grantee, and the duration of the grant varied substantially and were
tailored specifically in each case. Sometimes colonial legislatures
appointed special committees to inspect the invention at issue.
20 1
Such committees did not examine standard patentability criteria.
Their role was rather to inform the legislature regarding the specific
public benefits offered by the invention and its effect on various
interests, the chances of success, and what kind of special privileges
were suitable.
20 2
Many colonial and state patents included working clauses,
stipulating grants on the successful implementation of the invention
within a prescribed time.20 3 Working clauses, similar to the one-year
implementation stipulation in Winslow's Massachusetts grant,
204
Historical and Cultural Roots of Legislative Behavior in the British Colonies
in the Eighteenth Century, 75 AM. HIST. REv. 337 (1969).
198. See BUGBEE, supra note 6, at 57, 63.
199. See, e.g., id. at 73-77 (documenting the petitions for patents in
Maryland and South Carolina).
200. See, e.g., id. at 73-80.
201. Both of Maryland's colonial patents for invention issued in 1770 to
John Clayton and Isaac Perkins were granted after inspection by an appointed
committee. See PROCEEDINGS AND ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
MARYLAND 1769-1770, at 12, 231, 285, 289, 315-16, 334-35 (Raphael ed.,
Md. Historical Soc'y 1945) [hereinafter MARYLAND PROCEEDINGS]. Hugh
Swinston's 1743 patent was granted in South Carolina after examination and
report by an appointed committee. THE JOURNAL OF THE COMMONS HOUSE OF
THE ASSEMBLY 1742-1744, at 178, 187-88, 191-92, 198, 204 (J.H. Easterby
ed., S.C. Archives Dep't 1954) [hereinafter SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL].
202. See, e.g., BUGBEE, supra note 6, at 81-82; SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL,
supra note 201, at 187, 191-92.
203. See BUGBEE, supra note 6, at 81-82.
204. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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appeared in almost all of the colonial patents for invention, including
those made toward the end of the period.2 °5 Grants sometimes
stipulated the quality or price of the product to be produced.2 °6
There were also occasional apprentice clauses mandating the grantee
to take a certain number of local apprentices.
20 7
All of these practices shaped the American patent grant as a
variant of its English cousin, sharing its basic institutional model of
patent privileges. Moreover, the seventeenth century developments
that reshaped the English framework were, for the most part, absent
in the colonies. There were no local equivalents of the English
common law monopoly cases. 2 08 Interestingly, some of the more
sophisticated colonies legislated local diluted versions of the Statute
of Monopolies. Yet these were mainly declaratory acts with little
practical effect. The Massachusetts 1641 Body of Liberties provided,
"No monopolies shall be granted or allowed amongst us, but of such
new Inventions that are profitable to the Countrie, and that for a short
time.,,20 9 This echoed the English political discourse regarding good
monopolies and bad monopolies, 21° but it did nothing to give any bite
to the declaration. The assembly that was the granting authority was
left to decide on a case-specific basis what were "new Inventions that
are profitable to the Countrie," 211 and what were the appropriate
conditions of the grant.
205. See RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 195.
206. Maryland's 1770 patent to John Clayton, for example, noted his claim
that his thresher will be sold at a "reasonable price." MARYLAND
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 201, at 315.
207. Benjamin Crabb's 1750 patent for making candles, for example,
stipulated that Crabb had to teach his process to five inhabitants of the colony.
3 ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS BAY 546-47 (Boston, 1878).
208. In fact, there are no known colonial cases involving patent grants.
209. The Body of Liberties of 1641; A Coppie of the Liberties of the
Massachusets Colonie in New England, in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF
MASSACHUSETTS, REPRINTED FROM THE EDITION OF 1660 WITH THE
SUPPLEMENT TO 1672, at 33, 34-35, para. 9 (Boston 1890) [hereinafter Body of
Liberties]. This clause was retained in the 1648 enlarged version of the
Massachusetts code. THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 43 (Max
Farrand ed., n.p. 1929) (1648). Connecticut enacted a similar law in 1672.
THE LAWS OF CONNECTICUT: AN EXACT REPRINT OF THE ORIGINAL EDITION
OF 1673, at52 (1865).
210. See supra discussion accompanying notes 87-89.
211. Body of Liberties, supra note 209, at 34-35.
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American patents also did not undergo a standardization process
similar to the English one. In the colonies and states, it was a
legislative procedure, not a bureaucratic one, that gave rise to
patents. Thus, in all cases, a patent grant involved a process of
political deliberation and discretion.212 In periods when interest in
patent grants was lost, there was no executive process that kept
operating on its own momentum. The outcome was the absence of
such patents rather than their issue on demand.
The state patent grant practice that persisted into the early
nineteenth century retained all of the characteristics of the colonial
grants. The only respects in which the later state grants showed any
sign of change were growing differentiation of invention patents as a
special subset of grants, and the gradual emergence of the modem
concept of invention. 213 With one limited exception, the state grants
did not move at all from the patent-privileges model toward patent
rights. The exception was a provision in the 1784 South Carolina
copyright statute that created equivalence between the newly created
general entitlements of authors and those of inventors. 2 14  It
provided, "[T]he Inventors of useful machines shall have a like
exclusive privilege of making or vending their machines for the like
terms of 14 years, under the same privileges and restrictions hereby
granted to, and imposed on authors of books." 2 15  This was an
important landmark that reflected the change in thought about
patents, but it was not a definite move in practice from patent
privileges to patent rights. The statute did not create any procedure
or apparatus for the award of invention patents, and patents issued in
South Carolina after the 1784 statute were still granted on a
particularistic basis of specific petition and legislation.21 6
212. See id.
213. The most salient indication of this trend was a growing tendency in
state grants to require disclosure and specifications. See, e.g., BUGBEE, supra
note 6, at 85-88, 94.
214. IV STATUTE AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 618-20 (David J. McCord
ed., 1837-1868).
215. Id. at 620. There was a prior unsuccessful attempt in South Carolina to
enact a general patent provision in 1744. See BUGBEE, supra note 6, at 80-81.
216. For examples of such grants, see BUGBEE supra note 6, at 93-95.
Federico notes that "[i]n practice this section only operated as an invitation to
inventors to request the legislature for patents." Federico, supra note 13, at
167.
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Colonial and state patent grants and their bureaucratic practices,
despite their peculiar variations, were deeply rooted in the traditional
English patent-privileges institutional model. Ironically, by 1789,
after more than a century of semi-independent development, the
American local mutation was much more similar to the early English
patent grant than were English patents of the time.
III. THE AMERICAN FEDERAL PATENT REGIME
The genesis of the American federal patents was in the
Intellectual Property clause of the Constitution that gave Congress
the power to "promote the Progress of Sciences and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."21 7 A lot has
been written about this clause.218  Some argue that the U.S.
Constitution created the "first modem patent institution regime."
219
Others go further and draw from the constitutional text far-reaching
conclusions about an underlying concept of patents as rights, and
220even as natural rights. Such conclusions are not supported by the
little we know about the legislative history of the clause. In fact,
there is no reason to assume that, apart from creating the grant power
on the federal level, the clause constituted any break with traditional
patterns. The immediate sources of influence and inspiration
available to the framers were English patents and the grant practice
in the colonies and the states. 221 There is no evidence that any of the
framers contemplated, at that stage, a break with those familiar
patterns or the creation of a "modem patent system."
222
Indeed, early potential patentees and the first Congress did not
show any sign of interpreting the constitutional clause as
217. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 8.
218. For comprehensive research, see EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE
NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE (2002).
219. B. Zorina Khan & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, History Lessons: The Early
Development of Intellectual Property Institutions in the United States, 15 J.
ECON. PERSP. 233, 235 (2001).
220. See, e.g., Frank D. Prager, Historic Background and Foundation of
American Patent Law, 5 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 309, 318 (1961); BUGBEE, supra
note 6, at 129-30; Ramsey, supra note 30, at 15-16. For critique see,
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 218, at 212-20.
221. See Ramsey, supra note 30, at 15.
222. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 218, at 218-20.
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necessitating a deviation from existing practices. 223  Soon after
Congress convened, a trickle of patent petitions arrived, and the
trickle gradually grew into a flood.224 Petitioners, some of whom
referred to the constitutional clause, acted in familiar patterns.225
Their petitions detailed the specific social benefits that their
inventions offered and asked for private laws granting case-specific,
exclusive privileges and sometimes other "encouragements," such as
the commission of an official printer226 or the financing of a
scientific expedition.227 As far as the petitioners were concerned, the
only effect of the constitutional clause was to transfer the familiar
grant practice to the federal level.228 Congress did not seem to think
otherwise. It did not reject the individual privilege petitions, but
rather transferred them for consideration on the merits by a special
committee. In at least one case, a private enactment was almost
passed.229
At some point, for reasons that remain somewhat obscure, the
House dealing with the various individual petitions decided to
respond by enacting a general patent law.230 After a complex
legislative process,23 1 Congress passed the 1790 Act to Promote the
223. See id. at 80-81.
224. For a survey of early petitions, see BUGBEE, supra note 6, at 131-41;
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 34, at 81-87, 115-16.
225. See BUGBEE, supra note 6, at 133-41.
226. This request was included in Francis Bailey's petition for his printing
device. See id. at 140.
227. In his April 1789 petition for a patent for items utilizing his method of
determining longitude based on magnetic variation John Churchman also
petitioned for funding of an expedition to Baffm's Bay. See Proceedings in
Congress During the Years 1789 and 1790, Relating to the First Patent and
Copyright Laws, 22 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 243, 244 (1940) [hereinafter
Proceedings].
228. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 34, at 115-16.
229. This was Francis Bailey's petition. The House passed a private
enactment granting him protection, but, as legislation of the general patent
statute advanced, the Senate failed to act and the private enactment was never
passed. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 34, at 117.
230. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOURNAL 29 (L.G.
De Pauw et al. eds., 1977); MARYLAND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 201, at 246.
231. For a detailed account of the legislative process see WALTERSCHEID,
supra note 34, at 84-143.
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Progress of the Useful Arts. 232 To the extent that any break with past
patterns occurred and the beginning of a modem patent system
emerged, it was not in the constitutional clause, but under the new
statutory framework.233  This framework was first created by the
1790 Patent Act and underwent crucial changes during the following
years.234 The transformation of the institutional model of patents and
the appearance of modem patent rights during the first half of the
nineteenth century occurred through those statutory developments
and related administrative practices, as well as through the emerging
case law of patents. 235 In what follows, I describe the conceptual and
institutional developments of patents in those three different arenas:
(1) the formal statutory level, (2) the administrative grant practices,
and (3) the emerging law of patents in the courts.
A. The 1790 Patent Act: An Early Examination System?
From the inception of the federal regime, a few voices began to
argue that, in the words of John Fitch, "patents are now obtained as a
matter of property and as a matter of right. 236  In 1792, Joseph
Barnes went so far as to argue that "each American citizen has a
constitutional right to claim that his property in the product of his
genius should be secured by the National Legislature."237 Probably
best known-and misleading to some later observers-was the 1793
argument of Rep. William Murray, who framed the issue in terms of
a sharp contrast between the English privilege-based system and
supposed American patent rights:
The minds of some members have taken a wrong direction
... from the view in which they had taken up the subject
under its analogy with the doctrine of patents in England.
232. Act To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts (1790 Patent Act), ch. 7, 1
Stat. 109 [hereinafter 1790 Patent Act].
233. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 34, at 109.
234. See id. at 145.
235. See id. at 243-80.
236. Frank D. Prager, The Steam Boat Interference 1787-1793, 40 J. PAT.
OFF. SoC'Y 611, 633 (1958).
237. JOSEPH BARNES, TREATISE ON THE JUSTICE, POLICY AND UTILITY OF
ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTUAL SYSTEM FOR PROMOTING THE PROGRESS OF
USEFUL ARTS BY ASSURING PROPERTY IN THE PRODUCTS OF GENIUS 16
(Phila. 1792) (Barnes was James Rumsey's attorney and was active both in
promoting individual patent applications and in lobbying for statutory reform).
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There is this strong feature which distinguishes that doctrine
in that country from the principles on which we must settle
it in this. These patents are derived from the grace of the
Monarch, and the exclusive enjoyment of the profits of a
discovery is not so much a right inherent as it is a privilege
bestowed and an emanation of prerogative. Here, on the
contrary, the citizen has a right in the inventions he may
make, and he considers the law but as the mode by which
he is to enjoy their fruits.
238
All of this was a mix of wishful thinking, inaccuracies and rhetorical
maneuvers. 239 The main significance of such utterances is that they
indicate that by the late eighteenth century a crisp vision of the patent
rights idea consolidated, with some ideological support.240 A century
earlier this would have been unthinkable. The legal framework and
the administrative practices of the 1790s United States, however,
were far from a full-blown patent-rights model.24'
In some respects, the 1790 Act did constitute a break with
previous traditions and the beginning of a modem patent system.
2 42
The Act consciously created a general patent regime.243 Patents were
no longer the case-specific, legislative grants of the states, nor even
the peculiar English arrangement of defining the outer-limits of an
exception to a general ban on monopolies. Instead, the Act defined
in comprehensive terms the outline of a universal patent regime. 244 It
created standard substantive criteria for patentability that were rooted
in the English patent law tradition but also differed in some
important respects. 245 The Act also defined uniform entitlements,
238. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 855 (1793). For an example of taking this
declaration at face value, see Ramsey, supra note 30, at 16.
239. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 34, at 170.
240. See id. at 145.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id. at 145-46.
244. See id. at 141-43.
245. The major substantive criteria defined by the statute were: patentable
subject matter, priority of invention, novelty of the invention, and enabling
disclosure. For a detailed discussion of those requirements and how they
differed from English patent law, see WALTERSCHEID, supra note 34, at 109-
43.
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bestowed by a patent246 and standard administrative procedures, for
obtaining and granting patents. 247  These were important moves
toward the generalization and standardization of patents.
Despite those significant developments, the statutory framework
stopped short of creating patent rights. At the heart of the new
arrangement stood a forum that came to be known as the patent
board.248 This board consisted of the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of War, and the Attorney General. The Act mandated that,
provided that all patentability requirements were met, for any two of
these executive officers "it shall and may be lawful ... if they shall
deem the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important, to
cause letters patent to be made out in the name of the United
States."249
The legislative history fails to supply direct evidence on this
point. All indications are, however, that this, in effect, established
the patent board as an arm of the executive with full discretionary
power over patent grants. In other words, the patent board stood in
the shoes that in England were reserved to the crown. The 1790
statutory framework is often referred to as an "examination
system,' 25° but it was not an examination system in the modem
sense. The patent board was not merely an administrative agency
assigned the mere task of certifying the fulfillment of standard
patentability criteria and the duty of issuing a patent when they were
met. Instead, it was an arm of the sovereign with frll discretionary
power to weigh public policies and make case-specific decisions as
to whether to grant. The granting authority was no longer the
legislature as in the states, or the crown as in England. The
institution of the patent board was, nevertheless, deeply rooted in the
246. The Act defined the entitlement as "the sole and exclusive right and
liberty of making, constructing, using and vending to others to be used, the
said invention or discovery." 1790 Patent Act, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
247. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 34, at 141-42.
248. It was also referred to as the "Commissioners for the Promotion of
Useful Arts;" and the "Patent Commission." See P.J. Federico, Operation of
the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 237, 238 (1936).
249. 1790 Patent Act, at sec. 1.
250. See Khan & Sokoloff, supra note 219, at 236 n.3; see also BUGBEE,
supra note 6, at 144 (describing the establishment of patent examination as a
procedure).
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Anglo-American tradition of patents as particularistic discretionary
policy decisions of the sovereign.
The 1790 Act said nothing about a right to receive a patent or a
duty to issue one. It merely gave the board a discretionary power by
providing that it "shall and may be lawful" to issue a patent in a case
where the board finds that the invention is "sufficiently important
and useful."' 5 ' Moreover, there was no procedure or remedy that
enabled petitioners to enforce their "rights" for a patent in cases of
rejection. As far as one can tell, there is no inkling of the patent
rights idea in the 1790 Act.
It seems implausible that anyone contemplated a forum with a
personal constitution such as that of the board as having merely
administrative responsibilities. The members of the board,
specifically designated by the Act, were some of the highest ranking
members of the executive. It seems unlikely that such officials were
endowed with only the limited administrative task of applying and
"examining" the fulfillment of standard patentability criteria. It is
much more plausible that a forum composed of the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General was envisioned
as a body that represented the most important national interests and
was vested with a substantive discretionary power to make policy
decisions in the grant of patents.
The board's role as a discretionary dispenser of state patronage
does not just fit the immediate previous background of the English
and colonial tradition of patent privileges, but also the general views
of the time as to the proper role of government in regulating
economic life. The dominant mainstream views in the 1790s
regarding such issues were composed of variants of a Mercantilist or
Whig outlook.252 This outlook not only assigned government the
right and duty to actively foster economic prosperity for the welfare
and good order of the commonwealth. It also regarded the ordinary
and desirable tools for such involvement as particularistic privileges
and subsidies bestowed by government in a discretionary manner.
253
251. 1790 Patent Act, at sec. 1.
252. On the "Whig" political persuasion and its variants, see William W.
Fisher, Ideology, Religion and the Constitutional Protection of Private
Property 1760-1860, 39 EMORY L.J. 65, 72-74 (1990).
253. Probably the best, though not the only, example of the implementation
of this outlook is the corporate charter. Corporate charters that created
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:177
Hence, the framework of the 1790 Patent Act seems to be a
hybrid between the particularistic privileges of the traditional English
and state grants and the modem patent-rights model. The Act
created a kind of a "universalized privilege" system. It also
established standardized substantive and procedural criteria for
patentability as well as uniform patent entitlements. Yet the grant
remained a matter of privilege. Similar to the English post-Statute of
Monopolies arrangement, the patentability criteria only defined the
outer limits of the discretionary grant power. Outside those limits,
no valid patent could be issued. Within them, the sovereign's power
to grant remained discretionary and no enforceable individual right
for a patent existed.
What about the actual grant practices that created the social
experience of patents? Were patents regarded and granted as
"rights" or as "privileges" by petitioners and by the board during the
short years of its operation between 1790 and 1793? Unfortunately,
the sources available for reconstructing the exact practices and the
guiding concepts of the patent board are limited.254 Nevertheless,
when one assembles the available pieces, it seems that the
administrative practices of the patent grant reflected an
understanding of the patent board as a body with full discretionary
power, not only to "examine" the satisfaction of general patentability
requirements, but also to engage in case-specific assessments of the
relevant social benefits and the desirability of each grant.
corporations and allocated them special case-specific powers and privileges
were created by the state legislatures as individual enactments. This began to
change gradually only in the mid-nineteenth century with the rise of general
incorporation statutes. See JOSEPH S. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY
OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS (1917); Oscar Handlin & Mary Handlin,
Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1945);
LOUIS HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT:
PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860 (1948); MERRICK EDWIN DODD, AMERICAN
BUSINESS CORPORATION UNTIL 1860 (1954).
254. A fire in the Patent Office in 1836 destroyed most original records. A
few records relating to early patents were later reconstructed from various
sources. Records of the Patent Office & Trademark Office, Record 241.2:
Records of the Patent Office (Reconstructed Records) Relating to "Name and
Date" Patents 1837-87, U.S. National Archives, available at
www.archives.gov/research/researchroom/federalrecords guide/patent and_
trademarkoffice rg241 .html#241.2.
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It is clear that patents were not granted on demand, and that
many petitions were rejected.255 Little is known about the board's
reasons for rejecting patent petitions. In fact, it is doubtful whether
such reasons were issued. There is also no direct evidence of
rejection on the basis of the board's general discretion or the
"sufficiently useful and important" clause.256 Yet, the fragmentary
documents in existence convey a clear understanding by all persons
involved that the board exercised discretionary power. Nathan Read,
for instance, conducted a long correspondence with the board
regarding his steam engine.2 5 7 Read's basic stance, reflected in his
letters, was that "[h]ow far my improvements merit an exclusive
privilege, the Honorable Board will judge."258  Six months later,
Read was informed by Hennery Remsen, the board's clerk, that "the
Commissioners, at their meeting in April, agreed to grant patents to
all the claimants of steam-patents. 259
Probably the best evidence in existence about the character of
the patent board is in the few, full patent petitions that survived. In
1790, William Pollard petitioned for a patent in what he argued to be
an improvement on Arkwright's spinning machine. 260  Pollard's
255. Fifty-seven patents were issued under the 1790 Patent Act. It is
unknown how many petitions were rejected. However, based on the 1792
internal State Department report to which Federico points, there was a high
rejection rate. The report listed 114 patent applications under active
consideration at the time (hence it is likely that the total number was higher).
A comparison to the total of 57 patents granted under the Act gives a general
idea as to the rejection rate. Federico, supra note 248, at 244.
256. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 34, at 174.
257. Some of the correspondence and related documents are reproduced in
DAVID READ, NATHAN READ: His INVENTION OF THE MULTI-TUBULAR
BOILER AND PORTABLE HIGH-PRESSURE ENGINE, AND DISCOVERY OF THE
TRUE MODE OF APPLYING STEAM-POWER TO NAVIGATION AND RAILWAYS
(Cambridge, Riverside Press, 1870).
258. Letter from Nathan Read to Thomas Jefferson (January 8, 1791), in id.
at 53.
259. Letter from Henry Remsen to Nathan Read (July 1, 1791), in READ,
supra note 257, at 115.
260. The petition is available at the National Archive. See Records of the
Patent & Trademark Office, Record Group 241, 1 Copies of Specification for
the "Name and Date" Patents, 1790-1803 [hereinafter Patent Petition]. It is
quite possible that Pollard did not invent anything and that he was deploying
the "improvement" argument as a thin cover over a.petition for a patent of
importation on Arkwright's design. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 34, at 164
n.61.
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petition is remarkable because it is overwhelmingly devoted to
describing in detail and exalting the substantial social benefits
offered by his invention to the United States. Pollard referred the
board to "An account of the Cotton Mills in Great Britain & an
Estimate of the Cotton Manufactory of that Country," a list of
statistics that demonstrated the dramatic increase in productivity in
the years 1781-1787, presumably attributable to Arkwright's
machine. The following prose followed:
in the Southern states where young negroes & weakly
disabled Men & Women are at present a [Burden?] to their
owners they may in these cotton mills be employed to
advantage, and the same observations may be extended to
the poor white inhabitants in all our large towns.... One
girl or boy from eight to fourteen years of age will tend
from 30 to 50 spindles, & it is necessary to have man or
woman to every ten children, to keep order no exertion of
strength is required in the spinning apartment ... Your
Petitioner therefore prays that in consideration of the
expense & trouble he hath been at ... so as to perfect a
machine which promises such extensive advantages to these
United States ... that your honorable board will be pleased
to grant him ... the sole and exclusive rights and liberty of
making constructing & using of & of vending to others ...
for fourteen years.
261
Pollard also added a promise to submit his prices to inspection by the
board. In 1792, the relentless Pollard, who received his patent in
December 1791, wrote Jefferson and suggested that the board (and
possibly also "our worthy President") would visit and see "to what
extent it may be carried, and its usefulness in such a Country as
ours."
2 6 2
Similarly, John Fitch devoted the bulk of his June 1790 patent
petition for his steamboat263 to demonstrating the "great immediate
utility, and the important advantages which would in future result
261. Patent Petition, supra note 260.
262. 24 Letter from William Pollard to Thomas Jefferson (June 26, 1792), in
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 126 (John Catanzariti ed., 1990).
263. For a reproduction of the petition, see WILLIAM THORNTON, SHORT
ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN OF STEAM BOATS 13-14 (Washington, Elliot's
Patent Press 1814).
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therefrom, not only to America, but to the world at large." 264 Fitch
supplied long descriptions of the public benefits that were expected
to follow from his invention, including "increased value [that] will
be given to the western territory" due to the fact that "[t]he western
waters of the United States, which hitherto been navigated with great
difficulty and expence, may now be ascended with safety,
conveniency, and great velocity.' 26' To that he added that these
advantages would result in a "great saving in labour of men and
horses, as well as expense to the traveller." 266 Fitch's petition was
thus in the vein of the traditional Anglo-American grant petitions. It
offered specific public benefits and appealed to the sovereign's
discretionary power to grant, as Fitch put it, "public countenance and
encouragement."
267
In a 1792 petition, Oliver Evans was more succinct, but he too
made a point of arguing that "[t]hese engines are of such simple
Construction that they may with Convenience be applied to move
any kind of machinery that requires either a Circular or Vibrating
motion And to the propelling of land Cariages with heavy burdens in
an easie [sic] cheap and powerful manner."
268
In short, petitioners' views of the board were clearly saturated
with traditional privilege concepts. Their petitions reflect the
assumption that the board's role was to examine the public benefits
of their invention and use its discretionary power in deciding whether
it merited protection.269 It is possible that the board spent some time
certifying the statutory patentability criteria such as novelty,
although it seems that it purposefully bypassed deciding the most
significant priority dispute brought before it.27° Yet, the bulk of the
264. Id. at 13.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 14.
267. Id.
268. The petition of Oliver Evans is reproduced in 24 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 262, at 684. Evans never received a patent for
this particular invention. Id.
269. See id.
270. The board was faced with conflicting claims to priority regarding
steamboat related inventions by four inventors: John Fitch, Nathan Read,
James Rumsey, and John Stevens. Although opinions differ, it seems that the
board ultimately avoided the questions by granting patents to all four
inventors, leaving issues of coverage and potential conflicts to be decided by
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available materials from the board's work revolve around the
usefulness and public benefits expected to follow from specific
inventions. 271 There is no shred of evidence that anyone assumed a
patent was a right, much less that anyone tried to turn to the courts to
force the board to grant a patent.
In other respects, the grant's administrative practice broke with
previous patterns of patents as case-specific privileges. There
appeared signs of universalization and standardization. 2 72 It appears
that patent grants were phrased rather uniformly right from the start.
Not only were the grants limited to the standardized statutory
privileges, but even on the points where the board had discretionar
power under the statute uniformity seems to have been the norm.
27 3
Thus, the duration of all grants was that of the statutory cap of
fourteen years.274 Unlike the colonial and state grants, the federal
patents contained no case-specific limitations or provisions and no
working clauses. Finally, the board began developing its own
uniform rules of patentability to govern its decisions even within the
discretionary zone defined by the statute. 275 The degree to which
these self-imposed uniform rules existed and were applied up to 1793
is unclear. 276 To the extent that such rules governed the decisions of
the board, however, they further blurred the line between the old
privilege regime and the emerging right framework.
The short-lived 1790 federal patent regime was not equivalent to
the modem rights-based patent system. Rather, all indications are
that it was an intriguing hybrid. The statutory framework and the
administrative practices moved significantly toward standardization,
the courts. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 34, at 184-94; Federico, supra
note 248, at 249 (arguing that the board likely decided the priority question).
271. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 34, at 193 (discussing whether the
discovery is "sufficiently useful and important').
272. See 1790 Patent Act, ch. 7, sec. 1, 1 Stat. 109.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. In 1814 Jefferson wrote that "the patent board, while it existed, had
proposed to reduce their decisions to a system of rules." But he also added that
"[t]hey had done but little when the business was turned over to the courts of
justice." See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Thomas Cooper (Aug. 25,
1814) in 14 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 174 (A.A. Lipscomb ed.,
1904).
276. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 34, at 183.
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but the fundamental character of modem patents as rights had not yet
consolidated.
B. The 1793 Patent Act: The Registration Years
In 1793, after less than three years, the 1790 Patent Act was
replaced by a fundamentally different regime. Complaints from
petitioners about delays and difficulties in obtaining patents may
have played some part, but it appears that the main drive behind the
change came from the patent board members overwhelmed with the
burden of patent applications. 277  The essential difference of the
Patent Act of 1793278 was that it created a registration system-that
is to say, the authority in charge of issuing patents was allocated a
minimal role.2 79  It was neither to certify standard patentability
criteria nor to exercise discretion regarding the public desirability of
the grant.2 80  Instead, its role was limited to issuing patents on
demand whenever a few procedural demands were met and the
petitioner alleged that he met the substantive patentability criteria.
28 1
Although the text 1793 of the Act still mandated simply that "it
shall and may be lawful for the... Secretary of State, to cause letters
patent to be made out,' '282 it was clear that under the operation of the
new regime, patents would be issued on demand, upon the
satisfaction of a few procedures. Gone was the patent board and
consideration of patent petitions by top-rank cabinet members.
Under the 1793 regime, patents were handled by clerks of the State
Department, and by the Patent Office, established by Madison as a
283subdivision of the department in 1802. Despite attempts by
William Thornton, the dominant head of the Patent Office, to assert
some examination powers and impose requirements not explicitly
mentioned in the statute,284 the practice under the 1793 regime was
277. See id. at 195. In a 1792 letter, Jefferson complained of the time
demands of his patent duties that resulted in him being "oppressed beyond
measure," and expressed his wish to be relieved of those duties. Id. at 195 n. 1.
278. Act To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts (1793 Patent Act), ch. 11, 1
Stat. 318.




283. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 34, at 253-54.
284. See id. at 254-57, 259-68.
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one of registration. The patent office exercised no powers of
examination.285 In an 1811 pamphlet, Thornton himself instructed
potential patent applicants, "there is at present no discretionary
power to refuse a patent." 286 Years later, in 1836, a congressional
select committee observed that "[t]he granting of patents ... is but a
ministerial duty. Every one who makes application is entitled to
receive a patent."
287
Despite the swing of the pendulum all the way to issuance on
demand, the 1793 framework did not introduce the modern
institutional model of patent rights. Doing away with any
examination and discretionary powers at the issuance stage did not
decide the question of patents as rights or privileges. It merely
postponed it. In other words, the 1793 system shifted the real gravity
center to ex-post review in the courts. While the issuing authority
was deprived of any meaningful role, all substantive decisions
regarding patents were now to be made by the courts whenever a
conflict was laid at their doors.288 Ironically, while de jure the 1790
regime was closer to the British one, the 1793 framework resembled
the de facto situation in Britain, where by that time patents were
granted, in practice, with little examination or discretion.2 89 All
patentability questions were deferred to the courts.290 Members of
Congress, it appears, were aware of the parallel. As Rep.
Williamson explained, the proposed Act was "an imitation of the
Patent System of Great Britain" and was meant to "circumscribe the
duties of the deciding officer within very narrow limits."
29 1
This left the courts to not only interpret and apply the standard
patentability criteria, but also to shape the basic model of a patent as
a privilege or a right. Since the Statute of Monopolies, the character
of patents as case-specific discretionary privileges had two aspects:
(1) the issuance process; and (2) the patentability criteria, many of
285. See 1793 Patent Act, at sec. 1.
286. WILLIAM THORNTON, PATENTS (1811), reprinted in 6 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 98 (1923).
287. JOHN RUGGLES, SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE STATE AND
CONDITION OF THE PATENT OFFICE, S. DOc. No. 228 (1836) reprinted in 1836
Senate Committee Report, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'y 856 (1936).
288. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 34, at 355-56.
289. Id. at 235-36.
290. See id at 355-56.
291. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 855 (1793).
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which triggered particularistic policy determinations. 192 Moving to a
registration system eliminated the first aspect, but it left open the
question of whether the rules of review shaped by courts would
constitute patents as standardized rights or as discretionary, policy-
based privileges. To some extent, the institutional character of the
bodies placed in charge-the courts of law-had already decided the
question. Only to some extent, though. Courts and judges would
battle over the nature of patents for the next half a century, with the
patent-rights vision winning the day gradually, but not without
resistance.
C. Patents in the Courts
After 1793, courts became the main institutions wielding the
power to review and shape patents. Initially, at least some of the
judges saw themselves as stepping into the shoes of the patent board.
Judge Van Ness gave a lucid account in this vein in 1821.293 Van
Ness contrasted the American patent system with the English system,
and with the 1790 regime. 294  In England, he explained, the
proceedings for obtaining a patent are "tedious" and involved ample
opportunity for challenging the patent and considering its merit,
although by this time this was true mainly as a matter of formal law
rather than actual practice. 295 Similarly, the 1790 regime created the
patent board and "made [it] the duty of these officers to inquire into
the utility and importance of the proposed patent before it issued.,
296
Under the new system, he explained,
[I]t seems to me equally required by considerations of
expediency and public safety that, when all preliminary
inquiries are abolished, and monopolies and patents freely
and gratuitously given to all who present themselves in the
character of inventors or discoverers, there should be some
easy and summary mode of investigating their merits and
deciding on their validity.
297
292. See supra discussion accompanying notes 116-120.
293. See McGaw v. Bryan, 16 F. Cas. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1821) (No. 8 793).
294. See id.
295. Id. at 98.
296. Id. at 102.
297. Id. at 99.
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The new power in charge of reviewing patents, Van Ness concluded,
was a judge invested with "a plenary supervision over the legality of
patents" and with "a discretionary power." 298 By this account, the
courts were now entrusted with the exact role that was carried out in
Britain by organs of the crown, and under the 1790 American regime
by the patent board.299 In 1818, Joseph Ingersoll, arguing before the
Supreme Court, repeated the same argument when he stated, "[t]he
jury are substituted for the board, which, under the first law, was to
decide whether the supposed invention was 'sufficiently useful and
important' for a patent."3 °°
Van Ness and Ingersoll saw the role of courts-whether a judge
or jury decided-as equivalent to the discretionary power of the
patent board, except for the fact that it was to be invoked in ex-post
challenges. At the same time, however, there emerged an opposite
view that strove to shape the courts' power over patents in a
thoroughly different way. As observed by George Armstrong, 30' the
main battleground for those conflicting views was the interpretation
and application of the statutory requirement that the invention be
"useful."30 2
One line of utility cases dovetailed with the courts
understanding of themselves as the new locus of the traditional
discretionary power over patent grants. The utility requirement was
the main valve through which courts applied the power to review
patents based on their discretionary assessments of the net public
effects of specific inventions. In 1810, in Whitney v. Carter,30 3 when
Eli Whitney's cotton gin patent was challenged, testimonies were
produced "to prove the origin and progress of his invention."30 4
298. Id. The term "discretionary power" was used by Van Ness in regard to
the judges of the federal district courts that, according to one of the proposals
debated during the legislation of the 1793 Patent Act, were to have the power
to issue patents. His argument was that the ex-post review power by the court
that was ultimately adopted was the equivalent of that function. Id.
299. See id.
300. Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 488 (1818).
301. George M. Armstrong, Jr., From the Fetishism of Commodities to the
Regulated Market: The Rise and Decline of Property, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 79,
91-96 (1987) (citing numerous cases of judicial interpretation).
302. See 1790 Patent Act, ch. 7, sec 1; 1 Stat. 109, Act To Promote the
Progress of Useful Arts (1836 Patent Act), ch. 357, sec. 7, 5 Stat. 117, 120.
303. 29 F. Cas. 1070 (C.C.D.Ga. 1810) (No. 17,583).
304. Id. at 1071.
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When arguing the utility question, Whitney's counsel rhetorically
stated that, "the court would deem it a waste of time to dwell long on
this topic."30 5 He went on to provide the following detailed
description of the public benefits of the cotton gin:
The whole interior of the Southern states was languishing,
and its inhabitants emigrating, for want of some objects to
engage their attention, and employ their industry, when the
invention of this machine at once opened views to them
which set the whole country in active motion. From
childhood to age, it has presented us a lucrative
employment. Individuals who were depressed with
poverty, and sunk in idleness, have suddenly risen to wealth
and respectability. Our debts have been paid off, our
capitals increased, and our lands have trebled in value. We
cannot express the weight of obligation which the country
owes to this invention; the extent of it cannot now be seen.
Some faint presentiment may be formed from the reflection
that cotton is rapidly supplanting wool, flax, silk, and even
furs, in manufactures, and may one day profitably supply
the want of specie in our East-India trade. Our sister states
also participate in the benefits of this invention; for, besides
affording the raw materials for their manufactories, the
bulkiness and quality of the article afford a valuable
employment for their shipping.
30 6
The reported cases of the time indicate that this was not an
exception. When the utility question was discussed, courts were
often provided with substantive evidence and arguments regarding
the social benefits and effects of the relevant inventions.
30 7
Two sets of related ideas were bundled together in this
approach. First, the utility requirements served as the main
instrument that enabled courts, at least to some extent, to carry out
305. Id. at 1072.
306. Id. at 1072.
307. See, e.g., Langdon v. De Groot, 14 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1822)
(No. 8059); Stanley v. Whipple, 22 F. Cas. 1046, 1048 (C.C.D.Ohio 1839)
(13,286). Cf WILLARD PHILIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 137
(1837) (referring disdainfully to "some of the earlier cases in Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts" in which substantive inquiries into the merits of potentially
infringing inventions were undertaken).
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the traditional role of the sovereign in granting patents.
30 8
Substantive utility inquiries were, in fact, a somewhat fossilized form
of government using its plenary discretion to ascertain the public
interest and allocate "encouragements" on a particularistic basis.
30 9
Second, this understanding of utility was also embedded in
traditional concepts of the intrinsic value of resources 310 and of
objective fair-price of commercial exchanges..
31
The 1822 Langdon v. DeGroot decision exemplified the
interaction of those ideas in the substantive utility mode of
thought.31 2 The court upheld a trial court instruction to the jury that
the plaintiffs invention was not useful.313 Judge Livingston relied
on the concept of patents as discretionary grants when he explained
that each invention must "be beneficial to the community" and offer
"benefits [that] are of sufficient consequence to be protected by the
arm of government." 314 When he applied this requirement to the
invention at hand, an attractive wrapper for cotton wool products,
Livingston's reliance on a pre-market conception of value became
apparent. He concluded that there were no "advantages which the
public are to derive from it."315 When faced with the objection that
the public was willing to pay "an enormous additional price" for the
new warping, he responded that this "extravagant premium" was
exactly what the consumer who "literally receives no consideration"
had to be protected against.316 Utility, in other words, was to be
evaluated by the court, which was entrusted with protecting the
public interest, and not by the market. This was exactly the point of
308. Cf PHILIPS, supra note 307, (noting that early cases required that the
"community... receive some benefit from the invention").
309. See id. at 20 (discussing a temporary monopoly as an appropriate
reward for creating a useful improvement).
310. See Armstrong, supra note 301, at 86-91 (relating the idea of intrinsic
value and its gradual replacement to that of market value in nineteenth century
economic and political thought).
311. See MORTON HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1780-1860, at 161-73 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992).
312. SeeLangdon, 14 F. Cas. at 1099-101.
313. Id. at 1100-01. Part of the controversy in the case was not over the
standard of utility, but rather regarding the adequate decider of such questions:
judge or jury.
314. Id. at 1100.
315. Id. at 1100-01.
316. See id.
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fusion between the two sets of ideas. By adopting a worldview that
refused to hand over the measure of public utility to the market, the
court occupied the role of a discretionary arbiter of intrinsic social
value. In the words of Livingston:
When congress shall pass a law, if they have the right so to
do, to encourage discoveries by which an article, without
any amelioration of it, may be put off for a great deal more
than it is worth, and is actually selling for, it will be time
enough for courts to extend their protection to such
inventions.... 317
The conservative interpretation of utility retained some of the
traditional character of patents as privileges and the ideological
framework that supported it. Parallel to this interpretation, however,
a conflicting line of cases appeared that challenged its fundamental
premises. Justice Story, in a series of patent decisions, was a leading
inspiration for this new line.3 18 In 1817, Justice Story first deployed
his new conception of utility in Lowell v. Lewis.319 He vigorously
rejected the defendant's argument that the invention offered no
public benefits because it was inferior to other similar devices
already in use.320 Under the conservative utility framework, this was
a rather common argument, but Story launched an all-out assault on
this "broad and sweeping doctrine." 321 "All that the law requires,"
Justice Story explained, "is, that the invention should not be
frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals
of society. The word 'useful,' therefore, is incorporated into the act.. . .. .. ,,322
in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral. Story's telling
examples of a non-useful invention were "a new invention to poison
people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private
assassination."
323
317. Id. at 1101.
318. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568);
Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1217); Earle v.
Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4247).
319. SeeLowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1018.
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Despite the role still allocated to the judge as the guardian of
society's moral standards, 324 Story's new formula constituted a
frontal assault on the two basic premises of the traditional view of
utility. Courts under the new interpretation developed by Story were
limited to ascertaining whether an invention crossed the line of being
"mischievous" or "obnoxious." 325  They lost their role as the
traditional discretionary arbiters of the social benefits of inventions,
and the extent to which they deserved governmental privileges.
326
As Story put it, "whether it be more or less useful" was irrelevant to
the public.327 Who then shall judge the value of inventions? Here,
Story explicitly appealed to a market-conception of value, very
similar to the one that started to appear in late eighteenth century
patent thought in England. 328 "If its practical utility be very limited,"
Story said, "it will follow, that it will be of little or no profit to the
inventor; and if it be trifling, it will sink into utter neglect." 329 In
Story's new vision the court lost its role as the discretionary allocator
of reward in the name of the public interest, and the market rose as
the only measure of value.
330
The conflict between these two lines of cases continued, but
Story's new framework gradually prevailed in the courts. 33' Treatise
writers immediately and uniformly adopted Story's views. In 1837,
Philips declared that "the construction of Mr. Justice Story ... is
324. This bundling of the ruling with the role of the judge as the guardian of
society's moral standards probably misled George Armstrong in respect to
Lowell. Armstrong, who keenly identified the significance of the
transformation of the utility requirement, mistook the decision as being
representative of the traditional conservative line of cases. See Armstrong,
supra note 301, at 92.
325. Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1217).
326. Cf PHILIPS, supra note 307, at 142 ("[I]t is not the province of the court
to go into the question of the extent or degree of usefulness.").
327. Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 169-176.
329. Bedford, 3 F. Cas. at 37.
330. Story would launch an almost identical attack on the originality
requirement in copyright law. See Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1839) (No. 5728); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass.
1845) (No. 4436).
331. See, e.g., Kneass v. Schuylkill Bank, 14 F. Cas. 746 (C.C. Pa. 1820)
(No. 7875); Whitney v. Emmett, 29 F. Cas. 1074 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No.
17,585).
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now universally adopted in the United States." 332 He went on to
elaborate the new orthodoxy according to which "it is not the
province of the court to go into the question of the extent of degree
of usefulness." 333 Earlier he explained that a patent is the "most
equitable" reward because invention "is graduated according to its
utility in the public estimation" and the inventor "is saved from
mistakes, favoritism and prejudices of censors."
334
By- the late nineteenth century, these views were utterly
triumphant. 335 Any previous pretensions of courts to replace the
patent board as the discretionary arbiter of the public interest under
the traditional privilege scheme were gone. Debates about utility in
patent law were now limited to an ever-shrinking periphery of
exploding machines 336 and gambling devices. 337 As far as ex-post
review by the court was concerned, the two premises of Story's new
orthodoxy were uniformly accepted: the role of courts was limited to
applying general standard patentability criteria, and the sole arbiter
and allocator of value was to be the market.
338
D. The Coming of Modern Examination: 1836 and After
In 1836, after a protracted period of dissatisfaction with the
patent regime and agitation for reform, another sea change occurred
in the statutory framework. The Patent Act of 1836 created the first
real examination system in the United States.339 Unlike its
predecessors, the Act specifically established the Patent Office as a
sub division of the State Department and defined its structure and
personnel.340 The Patent Act also provided for "an examination of
332. PHILIPS, supra note 307, at 142; see also GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS,
THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 37 (1954).
333. PHILIPS, supra note 307, at 142.
334. Id. at 20.
335. See Armstrong, supra note 301, at 93-96 (surveying the post-Civil War
period).
336. See Mitchell v. Tilghman, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 287 (1874).
337. See, e.g., Nat'l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89 (C.C.N.D. Ill.
1889). Another area in which utility remained a contested issue well into the
twentieth century was pharmaceuticals, whose safety and efficacy were not yet
clinically proven. See Armstrong, supra note 302, at 96.338. See PHILIPS, supra note 307, at 128.
339. 1836 Patent Act, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117.
340. Id.
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the alleged new invention" 341 and mandated that "if the
Commissioner shall deem it to be sufficiently useful and important, it
shall be his duty to issue a patent."
342
Despite the sufficiently useful and important language, the
newly organized patent office was meant to be nothing like the old
patent board. It was arranged not as a semi-political forum with
discretionary powers to grant privileges, but rather as a bureaucracy
whose role was to certify the satisfaction of standard patentability
criteria. 343 Just as the 1790 regime was grounded in the mercantilist
views of its time, the new framework cohered with the very different
dominant Jacksonian outlook of the 1830s.344 This outlook favored
governmental encouragement of private enterprise, but its top
villains were "special privileges" and the particularistic or unequal
distribution of economic benefits.
345
From this perspective, the patent law, like other laws designed to
stimulate enterprise, had to be a general law that offered equal and
universal opportunities to all citizens. The report of the Senate
Committee, headed by John Ruggles, prepared the ground for the
1836 Act and conveyed exactly this message.346  "Patronage,"
Ruggles wrote, "is necessarily partial in its operation." 347 The best
way, he concluded, was "a general law to secure to all descriptions of
persons, without discrimination, the exclusive use and sale, for a
given period, of the thing invented. 3 48  Scientific American
349
magazine conveyed the same point in, 1850, declaring "[w]e like
impartiality, system and fair dealing in every respect .... We care
341. Id. at sec. 7, at 119-20.
342. Id.
343. See Robert C. Post, "Liberalizers" Versus "Scientific Men" in the
Antebellum Patent Office, 17 TECH. & CULTURE 24 (1976).
344. See Steven Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent Law, 32
TECH. & CULTURE 932, 941-42 (1991).
345. About Jacksonian ideology, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT 56 (1948);
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF JACKSON 314-17 (1945).
346. RUGGLES, supra note 287, at 855.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. When Scientific American started appearing in 1845, it was devoted to
issues of technology and patents. Its proprietors became the owners of the
Munn & Co. patent agency in 1846. ROBERT C. POST, PATENTS, AND
POLITICS: A BIOGRAPHY OF CHARLES GRAFTON PAGE, 110-11, 125 (1976).
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not who the applicant is, let him be Jew or Gentile," and demanding
"uniform rules and regulations for all cases in the Office." 350 Two
years later, when reacting to a reader's proposal to substitute patents
with a state-prizes system, it announced:
This system of committee caballing and maneuvering, to
lighten the pockets of Uncle Sam, and to get special
monopoly privileges we do detest. Give us broad just and
workable laws, and let them be carried out faithfully-none
of your special systems, where favors are sought for and
obtained by particular parties in a particular manner.
351
The 1836 committee report echoed another related idea that by
that time already dominated the new line of utility court decisions.
352
A general law of patent rights was the best solution, it claimed,
because "[t]here appears to be no better way of measuring out
appropriate rewards." 353  In such a system inventors would
"generally derive a just and appropriate encouragement proportioned
to the value of their respective inventions." 354 Thus, disdain for
special privileges accompanied the emerging market conception of
value. General patent rights, it was argued, would insure that
inventors would collect the "real" value of their inventions, that is to
say whatever the market was willing to pay for them.
355
In such an atmosphere, it is hardly surprising that the 1836 Act
constituted a decisive move toward patent rights. The Act assigned
the Patent Office the role of certifying universal patentability criteria
and entitled individuals to a right to receive a patent whenever those
criteria were met.356 The last piece of the modem framework fell
into place with a new right to appeal the examination decisions. As
the committee report states, "the rights of the applicant will find
ample protection in an appeal to a board of examiners." 357 The board
of examiners, an ad hoc panel composed of "three disinterested
persons" to which any rejection could be appealed,358 was quickly
350. Patent Office and Reform of the Patent Laws, 5 SCI. AM. 317 (1850).
351. Government Rewardsfor Discoveries, 7 SC. AM. 221 (1852).
352. See supra discussion accompanying notes 324-330.
353. RUGGLES, supra note 287, at 855.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 855-58.
356. 1836 Patent Act, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117..
357. RUGGLES, supra note 287, at 861.
358. 1836 Patent Act, 5 Stat., at 120.
237
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replaced by the judicial system. In 1839, Congress amended the
Patent Act and replaced the board of examiners with the Chief
Justice of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. 35 9 The Act also provided a right of appeal to the federal
courts, including from the decisions of the Chief Justice, in "all cases
where patents [were] refused for any reason whatever." 360  The
issuance of a patent based on uniform patentability criteria was now
a right enforceable in the courts of law.
The practice of the Patent Office in the decades following the
1836 Act was characterized by cycles of "scientific men" who
employed strict standards of patentability and "liberalizers" who
slackened them and by public and political battles over these
policies. 36' Those fights demonstrated that even in the new system
of patent rights and "scientific" examination, 362 and even in the
absence of "special privileges," the grant of patents remained a
highly political issue. Yet under the new framework it was to be a
politics of universalization, with the arguments-even those of
specific interested parties-always aimed at the general standards of
the system, rather than at specific patents. Occasionally, when the
Scientific American was in a particularly combative mood, it would
accuse the Patent Office examiners of being "each [] feudal Baron[s]
of [their] own domain[s], 363 but by this time the old discretionary
privilege system was gone. Although there were differences
regarding the standard, nobody would deny that the Patent Office's
role as well as the courts', was to apply uniform patentability criteria
in order to ascertain rights, rather than to weigh public benefits and
grant discretionary privileges.
While other parts of patent law were still to undergo important
changes, by the mid-nineteenth century the aspect of the institutional
model of patents surveyed here acquired its modem form. A new
ideology and practice of patents as individual rights and of the
market as the only proper measure of the invention's value took over.
359. Act in Addition to "An Act To Promote the Progress of the Useful
Arts", ch. 88, sec. 11, 5 Stat. 353, 354-55.
360. Id. sec. 10.
361. See Post, supra note 343.
362. See id. at 28 (discussing the hopes of some for "objective scientific"
criteria to decide patentability questions in the new system).
363. Patent Office and Reform of the Patent Laws, supra note 350, at 317.
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The Patent Office became the "examiner" of standardized
patentability criteria. Courts assumed the sole role of the enforcers
of patent rights and deserted almost completely any pretensions that
some of them had entertained earlier of engaging in substantive
evaluations of the public desirability of specific inventions or
patents. The conversion of patent privileges to patent rights was
complete.
IV. WHY SHOULD WE CARE? SOME IMPLICATIONS
Since this essay is part of a symposium on the uses of the past in
intellectual property, one might ask what the value is of the
institutional history provided here. Is the story of the transformation
of English patent privileges into the modem patent rights of any
interest or use beyond the rather idiosyncratic curiosity of the
collector of strange artifacts from the past? The answer is that the
institutional history of patents may be useful to different degrees and
in various ways, depending on the user's interests and purpose.
First, the history of Anglo-American patents should serve as a
caveat to lawyers about the legitimate uses of history and historical
materials. A popular style of argumentation among lawyers and
courts consists of attempting to derive direct answers to
contemporary positive and normative legal questions from the past.
The structure of past legal arrangements, the "intentions" of their
framers, and the practices of related institutions are all mobilized for
this task. The story of the transformation of patents, however,
demonstrates that this attempt is often futile and sometimes
dangerous. What early legislators or bureaucrats thought about and
did with respect to patents is often irrelevant for supplying direct
answers to modem questions, given the fact that they operated under
a thoroughly different ideological and practical context. Worse still,
a particular view that made perfect sense in the world of patent
privileges might prove to be of little coherence or adequacy in the
very different context of patent rights. Hence, at least when
attempting to derive direct answers to current legal questions, past
attitudes and views are likely to be of limited utility.
Economic historians are much less preoccupied with questions
of original intent and much more interested in issues of innovation.
The debate around which most of the economic history of patents
revolves is that of the historical connection between patents and
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innovation.364  More specifically, the debate is about the
controversial claim that patents played a major role in the industrial
revolution and in the later rapid economic and technological
development in Europe and the United States.365 The transformation
of the institutional model of patents might prove a valuable piece in
solving this puzzle. When one goes down to the details, it turns out
that the term "patents" denotes very different sets of institutional
arrangements in different periods. It is plausible that such different
institutions had different effects on innovation. Thus, the fact that
the institutional model of patents underwent a radical change during
the nineteenth century becomes crucial to analyzing the question of
whether, and how, patents facilitated technological innovation.
Some of this institutional economics history of patents in the United
States has already been written.366 Yet to date, little attention has
been given to the particular aspect of institutional change detailed
here. It might prove beneficial to integrate the narrative of
transformation from patent privileges to patent rights into the
examination of the historical connection between patents and
innovation.
Other historians would be most interested in broadening the
scope of the inquiry to issues of context and causation. From this
perspective, the story of institutional transformation detailed above
would be put in its social context. Patents did not change from
privileges into rights in a vacuum, or through a purely "internal"
364. See B. Zorina Khan & Kenneth Sokoloff, "Schemes of Practical
Utility": Entrepreneurship and Innovation among "Great Inventors" During
Early American Industrialization, 1790-1865, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 289, 305
(1993) (concluding there was a correlation between patents and innovation
contrary to the theory proposed by economic historians that early inventions
were haphazard).
365. B. Zorina Khan, Property Rights and Patent Litigation in Early
Nineteenth-Century America, 55 J. ECON. HIST. 58, 93 (1995) (stating that
property rights in inventions that were property enforced promoted market
exchange and technological progress).
366. The salient examples are the writings of Zorina Khan and Kenneth
Sokoloff. See, e.g., Khan & Sokoloff, supra note 365; Khan & Sokoloff, The
Democratization of Invention During Early Industrialization: Evidence from
the United States, 50 J. ECoN. HIST. 363 (1990); Khan, supra note 366.
Although these authors explore the role of changing patent institutions, they
focus on what they call "the strengthening of the property right" and devote
little attention to the transition from privileges to rights sketched here. Khan &
Sokoloff, supra note 365, at 61.
240
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process independent of other ideological, economic, political and
technological changes. Such a contextual story however, does not
necessarily have to be either a functionalist or a determinist one. The
legal-institutional aspect upon which I have concentrated here should
not be reduced to a mere "reflection," or to the "function" of other
"real" social factors. In fact, the institutional story provided here
gives reasons to assume neither that developments in the legal realm
were always just reactive, nor that the borderline between legal and
other (e.g., ideological) factors 'can always be easily detected. A
good contextual story would describe a complex web of causation in
which all factors, including the legal-institutional ones, were both
active and reactive.
There is an important intersection between a broader contextual
account of the transformation of patents, and the narrower economic
history inquiry into the connection between the institutional model of
patents and technological innovation. Institutional economics often
neglects the social and cultural aspects of institutions.367 Institutions,
however, do not appear or function in the same general form in all
societies. Rather, various societies develop different institutions,
which are embedded in and mediated through their peculiar cultural
patterns, ideologies and power struggles. Consequently, the
economic narrative of the development and operation of patent rights
can benefit from being interwoven into the broader contextual story
of the history of patents.
I would like to end by exploring briefly yet another line of
inquiry that stems from the institutional transformation of patents
and the emergence of our modem framework of patent rights. I want
to point out a few structural affinities between this modem
ideological and institutional framework of patents that we have come
to take for granted, and some of the fundamental attitudes and biases
of our scholarly, political and legal thought on patents. James Boyle
has recently suggested 368 that intellectual property scholarship is
characterized by a radically narrow focus, or, as it were, by a
voluntary blindness. Most legal scholarly work in the field of patents
tends to restrict itself to a particular brand of utilitarian analysis,
367. See Acheson, supra note 10, at 25; Harris, supra note 10, at 340.
368. James Boyle, Enclosing the Genome: What the Squabbles over Genetic
Patents Could Teach Us, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN
GENOME PROJECT 97 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003).
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which is focused on the extent to which particular rules maximize or
inhibit technological innovation (narrowly defined). A multitude of
other considerations and perspectives is being shut out as either
irrelevant or as outside the purview of legitimate scholarship in the
field.
Although this modem tendency may be most acute in legal
academic scholarship, it is by no means restricted to it. Other fields
of discourse, especially those that have the most immediate
relevancy to the shaping of the actual norms and practices of the
patent regime, show similar symptoms. The same tendencies toward
an exclusive and monotonic focus on one peculiar utilitarian
perspective and a narrow definition of innovation could be traced to,
in various degrees, judicial opinions, practical legal arguments, the
administrative practices of the PTO, legislative proceedings, and
private as well as public reports and studies.
Moreover, in all of these fields of patent discourse, the voluntary
blindness is typically accompanied by a few other related attitudes.
First, there is the "dealt with elsewhere" approach. This is the often-
asserted view that a variety of other considerations ranging from
distributive justice to the ethical implications of certain patent
doctrines may be important, but the function of the patent system is
not to deal with them. Such other considerations, it is commonly
argued, should be dealt with "elsewhere," which only too often
ends up being nowhere. Second, there is the "one size fits all"
approach. 369 -Here, one finds a sort of imperialistic insistence that
patents, or rather one static, particular model of patents, fits all
contexts equally and should apply to "anything under the sun that is
made by man." 370  The upshot of this approach is, in the words
of the TRIPS agreement, no "discrimination as to ... the field of
technology." 371 Finally, there is a general tendency to ignore the
political economy of patents. This refers to the various ways in
which the political process and patent legal norms shape and are
369. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology
Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002).
370. S. REP. No. 82-1979 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923 (1952); see also
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
37 1. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, adopted Dec. 15, 1993, pt. II, Annex 1C: Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, Art. 27(1), 33 I.L.M. 81, 94.
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shaped by one another, and produce and are produced by one
another.
372
All of these loosely connected tendencies bear close structural
resemblance to the modem institutional and ideological model of
patent rights. None of them is a logical necessity of this model.
Nevertheless, the patent-rights framework seems especially
conducive to these biases. The historical account provided here can
shed some light on this connection. The traditional patent privileges
were openly political. They were political decisions of the
sovereign, exercising its discretion and making case-specific
determinations in the name of the public good. The legitimacy of
each patent grant was dependent on the plausibility and legitimacy of
the governmental assertion attached to it that, taking all relevant
considerations and interests into account, the grant served the public
good.373 Moreover, the "public good" in this context was not limited
to. a narrow conception of economic or technological innovation.
Patent privileges existed in an age with no sharp distinction between
"economic" (in the modem sense) and "other" public
considerations. 374 Under the new patent-rights framework, however,
patents lost this character. They became standardized general rights,
legitimized by the claim of the universal patent regime to
maximizing social utility.
The attitudes described above seem particularly apt to a culture
that is immersed in the ideology and the practices of patent rights.
When the character of patents as political governmental measures is
obscured, it is easy to lose sight of their political dimension. When
372. As I argued elsewhere, what one usually finds in this context is a sort of
schizophrenia: a dominant tendency to ignore the political aspect of intellectual
property rights, which is occasionally replaced by the opposite extreme of
reducing all such rights to the interplay of interest group politics. See Oren
Bracha, Who Killed Politics? Past and Present Perspectives on the Political
Sphere of Intellectual Property, in THE RULE OF LAW AND NEW
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY (forthcoming 2005).
373. Again, the first analogy that comes to mind of this basis for legitimacy
and its transformation in the mid-nineteenth century is corporate charters. See
JAMES WILLARD, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 (1978).
374. See WILLIAM NOVAK, PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 86-88 (1996) (the traditional meaning of the
term "economy" encompassing "any society ordered after the manner of a
family ... with a view to orderly conduct and productiveness").
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they are universalized and justified on the basis of the utility of the
general regime, it is only natural to restrict one's perspective to
narrowly defined utilitarianism of innovation, argue that all other
concerns should be dealt with elsewhere, and have an innate hostility
to any attempt at particularization.
I hope it is clear that the above is not an argument for a return to
the 1790 patent board or to individual legislative patent grants. It is
rather an argument about some of the side effects of the particular
institutional model of patents with which we ended up, and about the
sorts of ideological biases this model is prone to create. Here is,
then, one final possible use of the past in intellectual property. The
historical narrative of the transformation of patents from privileges
into rights may serve to remind us of those aspects of patents that
were obscured and repressed in our modem consciousness.
